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Abstract
Scholars have claimed that regimes of urban automobility have reached their functional and
ideological limits. Many cities are pursuing policies to restrict private vehicle use and prioritize
walking, cycling and public transportation. De-centering automobility represents a prominent
push to change resource intensive social practices and shift representations of ‘the good life’ in
cities towards the low carbon logics of shared resources. Yet, as the policies seem to be working
and policy makers seek to step them up, the celebratory proclamations of anti-car advocates are
dampened by growing resistance and claims of social exclusion. Hence, it is imperative to
account for transitions away from automobility as arenas of conflict over values.
I present research from Bergen, Norway – a city with a strong commitment to reducing the use of
private vehicles. The aim of this thesis is to reflect on the systemic parameters of social inclusion
in the context of these mobility transitions in Bergen and to describe the challenges of applying
these insights in practice. I consider social inclusion in the context of shifting norms, practices
and provision towards a common urban mobility system. Through multiple qualitative methods, I
analyze three interventions aimed at reducing private vehicles: light rail expansion, congestion
tolls and car free zones. These interventions have been contested by a new populist protest party
that claims they cause social exclusion and disproportionately impact those who have the least.
The research foregrounds the challenges of reconciling multiple aspects of social inclusion
within urban transformation by applying a ‘commoning’ approach. Broadly, commoning refers
to processes and conditions which support sharing resources and resist privatization and
enclosure. This approach critically engages with the strong normative tradition of liberal
distributive justice which prioritizes the value of individual choice and safety net solutions over
structural changes. I introduce the term ‘dynamic social inclusion’ and describe it through a
discussion of three conceptual areas related to mobility: access, imaginaries of space, time and
social change, and the politics of commoning mobility. I find that different inclusion goals are in
tension and identify fundamental constraints and trade-offs that policy makers and planners face
with regard to social inclusion and mobility transitions.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The dynamics of inclusion in urban mobility transitions
“The Anthropocene marks severe discontinuities; what comes after will not be like what came
before” (Haraway, 2016).
As the above quote from Donna Haraway’s opus Staying with the Trouble indicates, climate
change looms over us, like a giant question mark hanging in the air - will we change with it and
will we change fast enough? Many scholars have positioned cities as pivotal change agents with
great potential to advance progressive climate agendas (Amundsen et al, 2018; Solecki et al,
2018, Bulkeley et al., 2015). Not only can local actors design infrastructures and regulations,
they can also act in multiple capacities to demonstrate versions of the ‘good society’ through
political activism, experimental pilot projects, municipal policies and inter-city agreements
(Amundsen et al., 2018:26).
Urban mobility has emerged as a primary arena for action. Patterns of human settlement
worldwide are urbanizing at the same time as carbon emissions from passenger transport are
rapidly increasing. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate
Change (IPCC) estimates that greenhouse emissions from transportation have more than doubled
since 1970, with road vehicles being responsible for 80 percent of the increase (IPCC 2014:
606). If no mitigation measures are taken, the IPCC estimates that greenhouse gas emissions
from transport will increase by 50 per cent by 2035, and double by 2050 (i bid: 648). It is
therefore imperative that cities decarbonize their transportation sectors as localized efforts to
mitigate climate change.
However, environmental justice scholars have contended that a narrow focus on greenhouse gas
emissions obscures the possibilities to address structural asymmetries of power and privilege that
degrade environments in other ways and produce inequalities (Chatterton, 2016; Swilling &
Annecke, 2012; Nikolaeva et al 2019). For example, the spread of electric vehicles as the
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apparent ‘winners of the future’ (Henderson 2020, see also Sovacool et al 2019) threatens to
marginalize post-car visions of common urban mobility systems. In Europe research has
demonstrated that policies supporting the introduction and diffusion of electric vehicles are in
danger of reinforcing the cultural and consumptive patterns of automobility which
disproportionately benefit, male, middle aged and above average income groups (Peters and
Dutschke 2014). Indeed, in Norway the share of car sales in April 2021 marked a 77% increase
from April 2020.1 In addition, reports have shown that the subsidies and other policies designed
to encourage electric vehicle ownership have primarily benefited those in the highest income
brackets (Urbanet, 2020b). The true carbon footprint of electric vehicles is uncertain, but
preliminary research indicates there are non-trivial levels of emissions associated with their life
cycles (Henderson 2020, Sovacool et al 2019, Sovacool et al 2021, Bergman, 2017, Morten,
2018). In addition, struggles over urban space (Creutzig et al, 2020) and the uneven distributive
effects of transportation infrastructure investments (Enright, 2019, Levinson, 2010) are also
prominent concerns related to urban automobility. All these issues contribute to growing interest
in some cities for de-centering cars, including electric ones, within urban mobility systems.
Sustainable mobility transitions that challenge entrenched car culture represent a prominent push
to change resource intensive social practices and shift representations of ‘the good life’ in cities
towards the low carbon logics of shared resources. Many cities are pursuing policies to prioritize
walking, cycling and public transportation. Yet, as the policies seem to be working and cities step
them up, the celebratory proclamations of anti-car advocates are dampened by growing
resistance. The inherited geographies of car centric planning are entangled with everyday lives
and cultural meanings. This makes endeavors to restructure the way people move around deeply
contentious. They bring up fundamental questions about whose activities, movements, meanings
and practices are enabled collectively, how decisions are arrived at, who gains from urban
transformation and how power dynamics are condensed, reinforced or challenged. Hence, it is
imperative to account for mobility transitions as arenas of conflict over values.
The aim of this thesis is to reflect on the systemic parameters of social inclusion in the context of
Bergen’s mobility transition and to describe the challenges of applying these insights in practice.
A deep engagement with the social dimensions of transitions, while recognized as important, is
often neglected in sustainable mobility policies where the primary focus is on technological
1https://www.abcnyheter.no/motor/bil/2021/05/03/195756531/bilsalget-okte-kraftig-elbiler-dominerer
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innovation and economic growth (Gallo and Marinelli 2020, Karjalainen and Juhola, 2019,
Kohler et al, 2020). Literature that theorizes social inclusion within sustainability transitions
almost exclusively relies on liberal justice frameworks. Liberal policies of redress seek to
incorporate marginalized individuals and groups into existing social systems while leaving the
systems themselves unchallenged (Enright 2019; Sheller, 2018; Wolff, 1977). I seek to rethink
social inclusion in the context of shifting norms, practices and provision towards a common
urban mobility system to account for dynamic processes of societal transformation. Social
inclusion entails an essential capacity to participate in collective life. Dynamic social inclusion
recognizes that collective life is not a static concept.
This thesis foregrounds the challenges of reconciling multiple aspects of social inclusion within
urban transformation by applying a ‘commoning’ approach. Broadly, commoning refers to
processes and conditions which support sharing resources and resist privatization and enclosure
(Helfrich and Bollier, 2015; Singh, 2017; Huron, 2015). Commoning mobility means recognizing
the shared responsibility for how different mobility constellations shape societies (Nikolaeva et
al, 2019). This approach critically engages with the strong normative tradition of liberal
distributive justice which prioritizes the value of individual choice and focuses on safety net
solutions for particularly disadvantaged people. Commoning is a structural approach to inclusion
which counters regimes of scarcity (Hoeschele, 2010) with the affirmation of abundance within
planetary boundaries.
To investigate how a commoning lens changes the meaning of social inclusion, I link social
inclusion with three conceptual areas related to mobility: (i) access and exclusion, (ii)
imaginaries of space, time and social change, and (iii) the politics of social inclusion. Access to
mobility options is an important element of social inclusion because urban mobility systems are
central to accessing opportunities. Lack of access is therefore recognized as a form of social
exclusion. The way space, time and social change are imagined and assigned value within
traditional transport planning is contrasted with the commoning framework, revealing how
different imaginaries inform approaches to social inclusion. Finally, I elaborate on the politics of
social inclusion to account for the ways in which social inclusion rhetoric is a driving force in
political advocacy for and resistance to sustainable mobility policies. In the discussion that
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follows the presentation of the three studied interventions, I consider how my findings may
inform and be informed by the three conceptual areas.
I present a case study of the mobility transition in Bergen, Norway – a city with a strong
commitment to reducing the use of private vehicles. Through multiple qualitative methods, I
analyze three key interventions aimed at preventing growth in private vehicles: light rail
expansion, congestion tolls and car free zones. These interventions were chosen because they
directly challenge the historically prioritized, collective provision of infrastructure for
automobility. For this reason, they have been hotly contested in the public discourse which is the
second justification for studying these three interventions. In the last municipal elections, a new,
populist political party called ‘the people’s action against tolls’ won third place (Wanvik and
Haarstad, 2021). The party claims that the policies aimed at restricting private vehicle use,
especially the three interventions studied in this thesis, are unjust and socially exclusive towards
those who are already the most disadvantaged. I argue that different inclusion goals are in
tension, and identify fundamental normative questions, constraints and trade-offs that policy
makers and planners face with regards to social inclusion and mobility transitions. A key finding
is that transport is not a discrete policy arena and the social inclusion impacts of interventions
into urban mobility systems are entangled with processes in other sectors and scales.
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1.2. Research question and objectives
Following from the context presented above, the research question for this thesis is:
How are key policy interventions in Bergen aimed at restricting car use impacting
social inclusion in the city?
To answer this research question I selected three interventions to study: light rail expansion,
congestion tolls and car free zones. A full justification and discussion of the implications of
selecting these three interventions is presented in the methods section. In addition to the research
question, this thesis is guided by four objectives:
● collect multiple perspectives on the meaning and state of social inclusion related
to the three mobility interventions
● analyze these perspectives through the three axes of the conceptual framework
and elucidate the interdependence of the interventions and their networked effects
on social inclusion
● describe and reflect upon the power dynamics which shape social inclusion
outcomes
● describe the contours of ‘dynamic social inclusion’ through the analysis and
discussion of the data with the aim of building an empirically grounded
theoretical concept of inclusion suited to large scale social transformations
towards decarbonization
Pursuing the research question and objectives required operationalizing the term social inclusion.
I have done this in two ways. First, by theorizing ‘dynamic social inclusion’ rooted in
scholarship on commoning and mobility justice to account for shifting norms, practices and
provision towards low carbon societies. Second, by collecting data on multiple viewpoints,
experiences and perspectives from actors. These included people involved in formal processes at
5
the municipal scale such as professional planners, policy makers, institutional partners such as
the state House Bank, private developers and the chamber of commerce as well as residents of
the city who have differential access to modes of transportation. The primary qualitative data is
supplemented with secondary quantitative data.
1.3. Structure of thesis
The thesis proceeds as follows, first, I introduce the liberal concept of inclusion and theorize
social inclusion through the lens of urban commoning in a theoretical section. Flowing from this
overarching comparison, I discuss and unite three conceptual areas within a conceptual
framework of inclusion as commoning: access, imaginaries of space and time and the politics of
social inclusion. In section two, I then discuss the case study methodology and data collection.
Next, sections three-five feature a presentation of the empirical analysis for the three respective
interventions: light rail expansion, congestion tolls, and car free zones. This is followed by a
discussion in section six, which is structured in terms of the three conceptual areas of my
theoretical framework: access and exclusion, imaginaries of space, time and social change, and
the politics of social inclusion. Finally, section seven concludes with some indications for future
research.
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2. Inclusion through commoning
It is widely recognized that sustainability transitions should be socially inclusive. Since the
1990s, interest in the relationship between social justice and transport has steadily grown (Lucas
et al. 2016; Beyazit, 2010; Mullen and Marsden, 2016). The following section introduces the
primary way social inclusion has been approached in transportation policy and literature,
grounded in liberal theories of distributive justice. Thereafter, I engage critically with this
approach, by introducing an alternative concept that I term ‘dynamic social inclusion’, which is
grounded in scholarship on urban commoning and mobility justice. To explore the contours of
dynamic social inclusion, I delve into three conceptual areas related to mobility transitions:
access, imaginaries of space and time and the politics of social inclusion. I conclude this section
with a synthesis of the literature and a condensed description of my analytical approach based
scholarship at the intersection of urban commoning and dynamic social inclusion.
2.1 Liberal distributive justice
Theorizations of social inclusion in relation to transportation are grounded almost exclusively in
liberal justice frameworks. Specifically, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) has captured the
attention of many social justice scholars with his assertion that societies should maximize
benefits for those who have the least (Pereria et al, 2017; Martens 2012). Rawls’ theory offered
the first major challenge to utilitarian ethics in liberal political philosophy in almost a century,
putting the fate of marginalized people in poverty back center-stage (Moehler, 2018). While
acknowledging the progressive impact of Rawls’ contribution to liberal justice theory in the 20th
century, some critical scholars and activists have pointed out crucial blind spots that limit the
capacity for transformative justice (Enright, 2019; Mullen and Marsden, 2016). The two
blindspots I see as particularly important to highlight due to their relevance for my research
questions are (i) the pervasive influence of neoliberal ideology on Rawl’s conception of the
nature and functions of government (Patton, 2013) and (ii) the underlying commitment to
rational choice theory (Moehler, 2018). Neoliberalism is discussed in more detail in the next
subsection.
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Rational choice theory holds that discrete, atomized individuals act according to universal logics
to maximize their own utility. The preferences of these individuals can be aggregated and
provided for by expert planners and policy makers. Consequently, social inclusion is reduced to
redistribution seeking to incorporate people who are presumed to be disadvantaged according to
predefined indicators. This approach largely avoids participatory procedures and the recognition
of difference (Fraser, 1995). The literature on mobility routinely frames inclusion in narrow
terms of how the benefits and burdens of transportation infrastructures – understood as public
goods – are distributed unevenly in space (Hertel et al., 2015; Litman, 2012; Mercier, 2009;
Pereira et al., 2017; Wee and Geurs, 2011). Benefits and burdens related to mobility are confined
to the discrete policy arena of transportation (see e.g. Litman 2002; Lucas and Jones 2012; Rock
et al, 2014). Mobility justice scholars have pointed out there is “little conceptual clarity about
what justice means in the transport context” (Periera et al, 2017: 170) and that there is no
standard definition in practice or theory of a fair distribution of costs and burdens from
transportation infrastructure investments. In practice, inclusion in the liberal framework refers to
the diverse and fragmented attempts to incorporate marginalized people into existing social
systems and expectations while leaving the systems themselves unchallenged.
I agree that existing theories of distributive justice may be useful for identifying some of the
cracks people might fall through and designing mechanisms to prevent people from falling too
deep. However, I argue that they are ultimately insufficient to account for inclusion within the
complex, dynamic, and emergent processes of large-scale social transformation required for
decarbonization. For successful achievement of socially inclusive, low carbon mobility systems,
there is an urgent need for theories of inclusion beyond liberal policies of redress subsumed
under neoliberalism.
The notion of social inclusion I engage with is time and space specific. I aim to move beyond
transcendental first principles towards a comparative approach to make the processes of
inclusion and exclusion more explicit and tangible rather than describing what would constitute
an ideal, inclusive mobility system. This approach foregrounds participatory and disaggregate
approaches that recognize the indivisibility of agency from relational, historical and geographical
entanglements and the contested power relations that shape mobility options. For this, I turn to
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the literature on urban commoning (Huron, 2017; Nikolaeva et al, 2019) and the new mobilities
paradigm (Sheller and Urry, 2006; Cresswell, 2006).
2.2 Commoning
Broadly conceived, commoning refers to the conditions and forms of organization that support
sharing resources (Singh, 2017). This includes processes of inclusion, exclusion and the exercise
of power (Nightingale, 2019). Thus, commoning entails both distributive and procedural justice.
Commoning is often defined dialectically against enclosure, where enclosure implies
privatization and commodification. I take the notion of commoning in the context of low carbon
transitions to mean countering regimes of scarcity (Hoeschelle, 2010) with the affirmation of
abundance within planetary boundaries.
2.2.1 (De)Constructing Scarcity
“One of the privileges of power, and an integral part of its rationality, is the freedom to
define reality. The greater the power, the greater the freedom in this respect, and the less
need for power to understand how reality is ``really'' constructed. The absence of rational
arguments and factual documentation in support of certain actions may be more important
indicators of power than arguments and documentation produced.” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 321)
As follows from the quote above, the power to define something as ‘scarce’, for example space,
time or energy, establishes the terrain of appropriate responses. Scarcity is a ubiquitous rhetorical
strategy used both to advocate for accelerated sustainability transitions as well as to resist change
(Nikolaeva et al, 2019). Free market ideologues such as Diedre McCloskey (1990: 108) have
praised economics as "the science of the post-magical age", which "came to tell that all good
things must be scarce in equilibrium, all magical opportunities used up”. Today, neoliberal logic
based on the virtues of competition, efficiency and individualism dominate responses to scarcity
(Nikolaeva et al, 2019). The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 1) described Neoliberalism as a
“programme for destroying collective structures which may impede pure market logic”. Further,
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neoliberalism as a theory has the means of “making itself true and empirically verifiable” (i bid).
Bourdieu claims that,
“In effect, neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. Rather, it is a
‘strong discourse’ (…) It is so strong and so hard to combat only because it has on its side
all of the forces of a world of relations of forces, a world that it contributes to making
what it is” (ibid).
A key aspect of neoliberalism is the project to reorganize society and social relations through
technocratic and privatized forms of decision making. Scholars have argued this results in a lack
of transparency and democratic control (Harvey, 1989, 2008; Healey, 1996; Legacy, 2017).
Neoliberal ideology asserts that markets are the best way to allocate resources. Fundamentally,
scarcity is the premise for markets. Hence advocates of markets as the best way to allocate
resources tend to naturalize and generalize scarcity, detaching it from historical and geopolitical
entanglements. Neoliberal policies target defunding democratically controlled bureaucratic
institutions that allocate resources and provide services (Jessop, 2002). Once these institutions
are hobbled, market advocates can point out how inefficient they are and argue for further
privatization (Viens, 2019).
It is an established truth that we live in a privatized and commodified world in which an
increasing share of our lives are mediated through markets (see Patel 2009; Klein, 2010). In
literature on the commons, processes of commodification and privatization are understood in
terms of enclosure. This framing suggests that the conversion of things and services into
commodities is not natural but a social process. Enclosure entails a redistribution of resources -
dispossessing the many and allocating to the few. In the face of cascading economic and
ecological crisis, interest is growing in alternative forms of organization grounded in the
assertion that distribution does not have to be a zero-sum game based on individual property
rights (Harvey, 2011; Helfrich and Bollier, 2015; Huron, 2017; Singh, 2017; Nightingale, 2019).
Alternative forms of social organizing around shared resources counter scarcity producing
regimes of enclosure with the notion of abundance (Hoeschele, 2010). In the following section, I
discuss urban commoning and how this scholarship may contribute to thinking about social
inclusion and low carbon mobility transitions.
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2.2.2 Urban commoning
The notion of the commons has featured prominently in debates within human geography and
sustainable development studies (Ostrom, 1990, 2008). One of the most widely cited
publications of the past half century is ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968) which
argues for privatization and enclosure in response to environmental degradation. The narrative in
the article exemplifies the relationship between neoliberal economics, rational choice theory and
white supremacy all tied together under the false premise of scarcity within a zero-sum game
(Brinkley 2020, Harvey 2011, Hartmann, 2010, Ostrom 2008, see also Hardin, 1974). Ostrom
(1990) refuted Hardin’s claims convincingly enough to win the Nobel prize in economics in
2009. In the past decade, commons scholars have turned the noun ‘commons’ into the verb,
‘commoning’ to highlight the processes of (re)production that constitute a commons rather than
the notion of a static pool of resources. The latter exposes the commons to the vagaries of
commodification and privatization (Linebaugh, 2007; De Angelis and Harvie, 2013; Bresnihan,
2013). Conceptualizing commoning as a process of social organization brings to the fore
strategies and practices that can foster more inclusive, just and sustainable spaces (Jeffrey et al.,
2012) and as applied in this thesis, more inclusive and sustainable mobilities (Nikolaeva et al,
2019).
Recent scholarship on urban commoning has called into question both Hardin’s (1968) and
Ostrom’s (1990) conception of the commons as a subtractable resource, subject to overuse
(Huron, 2017; Borch and Kornberger, 2015). I observe that, within urban commons such as
shared spaces and public transportation, the more people use these resources the more their value
increases. When public transportation is treated as a public good and thus provisioned and
subsidized by the state, the services only improve with more users and the income from their
fare. The ‘urban’ thrives on connectivity and encounter (Merrifield, 2013; Huron 2015). Hence
the important distinction is not between users and non-users or how much use is sustainable but
rather the definition of appropriate use (Fournier, 2013). The goal is to stimulate the use of
shared resources which in turn increases their use value while shielding the commons from the
enclosures that translate them into exchange value (Harvey, 2008, 2011). Commoning scholars
emphasize that access to resources and opportunities should not be restricted by socio-economic
class or identity but by commonly agreed upon conditions of use. Thus, urban commoning
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moves beyond property rights (Rawls, 1971) and the distribution of ‘rights to access’ (Ostrom,
1990, 2008) to make ‘use’ conditional on care and reciprocity (Huron, 2017).
A definition of access beyond the rights-based approach emphasized in Ostrom’s (1990) work is
provided in Ribot and Peluso’s (2003: 153) A Theory of Access as, “the ability to benefit from
things – including material objects, persons, institutions and symbols”. While Ribot and Peluso
focused on natural resources as the things in question, I focus on access to the city conceived as a
commons. Shifting focus from the right to access the city towards the ability to access and
benefit from the city provides a more realistic picture. The latter is an actual property, reflecting
lived experiences while the former is a virtual property, reflecting potential but obscuring the
barriers that are exposed through engaging with the messy, contingent situations people make
decisions in.
Commoning scholars are particularly concerned with resisting elite capture of common
resources. Better access should not be relegated to the sharing of resources among already
advantaged urban dwellers or generate new forms of marginalized ‘others’ (Kurtz 2001). This
pursuit is far from straightforward. As Ostrom’s (1990) work demonstrated, the commons are
constituted through collective management and as such are not the same as ‘open access’ or a
‘free for all’ as incorrectly described by Hardin (1968). This means that the commons are
predicated on forms of exclusion which require the exercise of power (Nightingale, 2019).
The politics of social inclusion must contend with the consequences of the exclusions and
inadvertent production of ‘others’ that even the most well-intentioned efforts to transform urban
subjectivities and relations generates (Enright, 2019; Jensen, 2011). The instability implied by
shifting patterns of inclusion and exclusion creates the possibility of rupture such that, “any
moment of coming together can be succeeded by (...) relations that un-common” (Nightingale,
2019: 1). Signaling commoning as a process highlights ongoing negotiations around the
conditions of use that define access to the city and the potential for rupture. These negotiations
happen inside and outside of democratic institutions at multiple scales.
Many commoning scholars note the potential of the commons to provide spaces for constructing
social relations in the context of ‘increasingly failing markets and states’ (Fournier, 2013;
Linebaugh, 2007). Commoning literature often focuses on conflict and struggles as important for
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creating new political communities (Singh, 2017; Helfrich and Bollier 2015, González-Hidalgo
and Zografos, 2019). Notably, I did not find any commoning literature dealing with populist
ruptures or middle class resistance to commoning projects. Those who study commoning as an
anti-capitalist endeavor are interested in the collective political experience and subjectivities
produced through (mostly small) commoning projects (e.g. Linebaugh, 2008; Banerjee, 2008;
Federici, 2009). These approaches focus on the progressive potential of new political
communities but even as they recognize the possibilities for ‘un-commoning’ they do not address
the potential for new political communities pushing for regressive policies. I attribute this to the
focus on resisting ‘un-commoning’ from capitalist accumulation and neoliberal governance
models. The projects highlighted in the literature are generally initiated by communities in cities
but don’t constitute a commoning of the city more broadly (Huron, 2017). To common urban
mobility systems, there must be shifts towards more collective and democratic forms of
governance integrated into efforts to move beyond small, niche interventions and projects
towards commoning urban mobility constellations (Nikolaeva et al, 2019; Sheller, 2018).
However, large scale changes and the exercise of power can be expected to generate resistance
from people who are happy with current arrangements.
The possibility of rupture and ‘un-commoning’ together with thinking about processes of
political community formation is especially important for my thesis because finding ways to
align interests between different groups in ways that support sharing resources, i.e. building
solidarity, constitutes an essential element of social inclusion. In the following table I compare
liberal and commoning approaches, highlighting the salient aspects of each, as a consolidated
summary of the preceding discussion. In the following subsections, I build on this comparative
approach to discuss three conceptual areas, (i) access and exclusion, (ii) imaginaries of space and
time, and (iii) the politics of social inclusion. I identify these areas as likely to benefit from a
commoning lens to ensure that transformations towards low carbon, urban mobility systems are
socially inclusive.
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Table 1. A conceptual comparison of liberal and commoning approaches and values
Liberal Commoning
Rational choice Context specific, bounded rationality
Fungible individuals Relational, contingent subjectivities
Rights based / property Conditions of use / ability to access benefits
Privatization/ enclosure Shared resources/ commons
Instrumental rationality/ depoliticized Communicative rationality/ political
Scarcity Abundance
Reform Transform
2.3 Access and exclusion
Access is a specific aspect of mobility which is linked with social exclusion. I engage with the
dominant notion of inclusion within urban mobility policy and literature, ‘transport related social
exclusion’ and expand it by considering the dynamic, relational nature of access and inclusion.
2.3.1 Transport related social exclusion
Social inclusion and mobility have primarily been approached in research and practice through
the concept of ‘transport related social exclusion’ which seeks to improve access to mobility
options for marginalized individuals and groups. This approach looks at the social and economic
impacts that arise when people lack access to adequate mobility services. These impacts have
been documented for diverse groups and communities (Button et al, 2000; Rudinger et al, 2004;
Tillberg,2002; Uteng,2009; Lucas 2012, 2019). In the UK, transport related social exclusion has
been formally investigated by the Social Exclusion Unit since 2001, demonstrating a growing
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recognition of the issue in policy circles (Lucas, 2012). The literature emphasizes how lack of
access to mobility options disproportionately affects people who are already vulnerable in other
ways and how they might be better included into the existing system. Kenyon and co-authors
(2003: 210) provided this widely cited definition of transport related social exclusion:
“(It is) The process by which people are prevented from participating in the economic,
political, and social life of the community because of reduced accessibility to
opportunities, services and social networks, due in whole or part to insufficient mobility
in a society and environment built around the expectation of high mobility.”
This definition highlights that disadvantage is relational by comparing access levels to the rest of
society but still sites the situation of disadvantaged people as the necessary location of change
rather than the societal expectations themselves. Access and social exclusion are conceived of as
problems of individual capacity to translate resources into mobility. Following from this
discourse, mobility planners and policy makers frame access in terms of whether people with
pre-defined indicators of vulnerability such as unemployment, single parent families,
low-income areas or neighborhoods with a high concentration of immigrants have a basic
minimum level of access to public transportation. Meanwhile, levels of mobility amongst the
majority and the most advantaged groups are left unchallenged. In the context of rethinking
cultures of mobility in order to achieve rapid decarbonization, a narrow focus on incorporating
marginalized people into current systems of provision is insufficient.
2.3.2 Hypermobility
Drawing on mobility justice scholarship, the definition of transport related social exclusion
provided by Kenyon and co-authors (2003) can be interpreted as a question about how different
forms of movement shape social practices, expectations and cultures of mobility. This opens up
the inquiry beyond focusing on the characteristics of poverty to consider how exclusion is
produced through societal expectations and the strategies of the wealthy. To this end, Urry (2000)
solicits attention towards “reducing the escalating dynamic of hypermobility and its effects
across society as a whole” (Lucas, 2012: 9). Urry explicates the relationship between
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hypermobility and social exclusion by foregrounding how focusing only on the aggregate
increases in distances traveled, removed from the context of why the travel took place and by
whom, obscures the uneven benefits and burdens of hypermobility (Cass et al, 2005). This
framework also emphasizes how transport related social exclusion approaches, as they are
practiced, make assumptions about who is vulnerable and what type of access is required to
participate in society (i bid).
Lucas (2012) builds on the concept of hypermobility, and complicates the transport related social
exclusion approach by reintroducing agency with the notion of ‘self exclusion’. She draws on
Barry (2002) and Currie and Delabosc (2010) to discuss exclusion as a result of people’s own
preferences and attitudes which determine both the mobility options available to them as well as
their willingness to use public transportation when it is available. These authors suggest that
addressing the dynamic relationship between social inclusion and mobility systems implies
paying attention to self-enforced exclusion in addition to externally imposed barriers. For
example, policy makers should consider limiting the ability of people in higher income brackets
to ‘opt-out’ from using public transportation either by choosing to live in areas with no service or
by driving even though good public transportation exists. The latter point highlights how
focusing on access levels is insufficient to account for modal shifts and inclusion into the
common mobility system.
This underexplored aspect of social inclusion linked with mobility is one of the key features of
my study. The strategies of the poor are often circumscribed by the strategies of the wealthy, thus
a narrow focus on including marginalized people misses the opportunity to understand and
rectify the processes that produce exclusion and inequity. Further, it misses the potential for
aligning interests and building solidarity among people at any point along the socio-economic
spectrum, for example with regard to clean air or thriving urban spaces of encounter. Dynamic
social inclusion then, interprets access as a relational and subjective concept dependent on
cultural context and societal expectations. Furthermore, levels of access are entangled with the
strategies of different socio-economic classes.
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2.4 Imagining space, time and social change
This section addresses the way space, time and social change are imagined in traditional
transport planning contrasted with the approaches found in mobilities scholarship. The purpose is
to illustrate how these conceptions are linked with values. I contend that making these values
explicit allows for a more democratic discussion of the trade-offs entailed in different approaches
to mobility and social inclusion.
2.4.1 Traditional transportation planning
Transportation infrastructure is a dimension of mobility that has traditionally been treated as an
isolated policy arena dominated by economists and engineers. The primary method underpinning
transport investment decisions is ‘predict and provide’. This entails forecasting future demand
from models of current demand based on the aggregate of observed preferences. These
preferences are assumed to be fixed and supply side limitations are viewed as deficiencies to be
overcome rather than policy tools to shape the trajectory of mobility systems (Beyzit, 2010;
Levinson, 2019). Supply side policies to reduce travel volume are thus taboo, meaning
reductions are left to the demand side (Holden, 2007). This translates into emphasizing
individual responses to a large-scale societal crisis.
Following ‘predict and provide’ models, the next step is to apply cost -benefit analysis making
extensive use of financial costs and projected benefits of investments with scant consideration of
environmental impacts or consideration of social impacts at a disaggregate level (Beyazit, 2010;
Levinson, 2019). Social impacts are translated into economic terms where travel time (both
actual and projected) equates to a monetary amount. Travel time ‘saved’ is counted as economic
gain for individuals and economic growth for regions and nations. The dominant perspective in
the transportation sector is that knowledge is of little value unless it can be quantified (Rodrigue,
2020). Mobilities scholars argue that the disregard for relational subjectivities (Manderscheid,
2014), differential experiences of gendered and racialized bodies (Uteng, 2009), and uneven
distributional effects (Beyazit, 2010) tends to support policies that favor people who are already
highly mobile and privileged in other ways (Urry, 2000; Cresswell, 2010; Sheller, 2018).
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The lack of accounting for uneven social impacts is exacerbated through the lack of post-ante
evaluations. Practices of post-ante evaluation are rarely institutionalized in the transport sector.
This provides the conditions for overly optimistic appraisals of the potential for large road
projects to produce widespread societal benefits while simultaneously obscuring the negative
impacts (Langmyhr, 2001). Transport policy documents are routinely designed to read like
non-normative academic texts, reflecting,
“the pursuit of an 'apolitical' economic equilibrium, turning politics into something that
we should all agree on—if we are rational. It is but a short next step to dismiss opposition
as irrational and hence close the discussion before all points of view have been elaborated
and appropriately presented.” (Sager, 1999: 517).
Neoliberal rationality is concerned with the ‘efficient’ allocation of resources rather than
equitable distribution or social inclusion. Societal benefit is presumed to flow naturally from
economic growth. Sager (1999) claims that, “The purpose is often to make conflicts go away.
(…) bounded rationality is banished from the transport policy documents. Best-solutions are in
line with the optimality-thinking of the transport plans, while satisficing is not, as it does not
guarantee consistent decisions” (Sager 1999: 518).
In this section I have described the way space, time and social change are imagined in traditional
transport planning. Key concepts include predict and provide which relies on demand side
signals for large scale changes and prioritizing reduced travel times translated into economic
benefits and growth. Traditional transport planning leaves little room for participation, preferring
to rely on technocratic modes of governance. In the next section I describe an alternative
approach to conceptualizing and governing mobility developed by mobilities scholars.
2.4.2 The mobilities turn
The mobilities turn refers to a contemporary paradigm in the social sciences founded by John
Urry and Mimi Sheller at the turn of the century (2000). Mobility scholars argue that by making
assertions about what is valuable and what creates value, transport policy documents embody
normative ideas linked with their assumptions about how mobility systems do or could work. For
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example the assumption that reduced travel times are inherently valuable and that they create
value through economic growth. While the purpose of traditional transport planning is to
overcome space (Rodrigue, 2020), mobilities scholars argue transportation infrastructures
produce space which entails trade-offs and is therefore inherently political (Rutherford, 2020;
Enright, 2019).
The theorization of a “politics of mobility” (Cresswell, 2010, 2006) interrogates the forces that
shape and reinforce high‐carbon mobility and corresponding lifestyles. Mobilities scholarship
rejects the view that transportation is a discrete policy arena and instead looks for networked
relations between different sectors and scales. Analytical approaches within the mobilities turn
put political economics, with it's attention to power dynamics and underlying socio-cultural,
political and economic structures (Keblowski and Bassens, 2018) into conversation with studies
of everyday practices, embodied knowledge and affect (Doughty and Murray 2015; Jensen,
2011; Waitt and Harada, 2012). Thus, mobilities scholarship focuses not only on the movement
of bodies in space but also the power of discourses, social practices and technologies in
reinforcing and challenging cultures of mobility (Sheller, 2018).
Scholars working from this framework recognize three dimensions of mobility; movement,
meaning and practice (Cresswell, 2010). Movement is the central focus of transportation
geography, the actual kinetics of bodies in motion which can be modelled and analyzed
quantitatively through for example travel time, trip patterns and modal choices. Meaning refers
to the representations and discourses that give movement shared meanings for example links
between what type of car one drives and the identity they wish to project to the world which is
facilitated by advertisement campaigns. Practice incorporates insights from social practice theory
to include “the internal world of will and habit and the external world of expectation and
compulsion” (i bid: 20).
The relationship between automobility, social relations and the production of space has been a
central focus within mobilities scholarship (Sheller and Urry, 2006; Mattoili et al, 2020). Illich
(1974: 42) summarized one of the central concepts neatly by saying, “Motorized vehicles create
remoteness which they alone can shrink. They create distances for all and shrink them for only a
few”. Critical mobility scholars have built on this thought, describing how,
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“Effectively, the twin processes of social and physical reconstruction transform roads
from a commons, accessible to everyone, to a space reserved to car users, making a car a
critically important needs satisfier while also limiting the ability of other transport modes
to satisfy people's needs.” (Mattoili et al, 2020: 6)
In The city and the car, Sheller and Urry (2000), “examined how the automobile was not simply
a technology of transport, but had transformed public space, public life, and democratic
participation” (Sheller 2018: 21). These approaches pay close attention to interactions between
modes of mobility, social relations and ‘the production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 2008).
The relationship between structure and agency is central to the emancipatory potential of
concepts like ‘the production of space’ . Stated very simply, we make spaces and spaces make
us. This leads to the notion of the right to the city (i bid) which can be summarized as the right to
change ourselves through changing the city. These ideas inform transition scholars such as Burch
and co-authors (2014) who argue that community level interventions and experiments can make
space for low carbon logics, thereby planting the seeds of transformation.
In conclusion, mobility justice scholarship aims for more than to describe, explain and make
current arrangements more socially inclusive (Sheller, 2018). They seek to materialize transitions
which contribute to more socially just cultures of mobility. Conceiving of culture as a dynamic
phenomenon subject to change reveals possible levers for transformation towards low carbon
futures. Denaturalizing culture also exposes the discursive strategies and relations of power that
underpin it’s reproduction. This is important for discussions of social inclusion where efforts to
reduce private vehicle use clash with the culture of automobility. Treating systems of urban
mobility in terms of social production and the production of space, rather than the effort to
overcome space, opens up the possibility for intentionally re-configuring spatial arrangements to
support social transformation consonant with decarbonization (Bulkeley et al, 2013).
Transformations are expected to surface tensions and contestations. In the next section I delve
into the processes of legitimation and politics of social inclusion related to commoning urban
mobility.
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2.5 The politics of social inclusion
A very broad definition of politics can be summarized as, “all of the activities of cooperation and
conflict that emerge as humans make decisions about the creation and distribution of resources”
(Leftwich 1983: 11, as cited by Avelino et al. 2016: 557). I adopt an elaborated notion where
politics involves the formation of identity through relationships, processes of legitimation and
the negotiation of values (e.g. Bulkeley et al, 2015; Nightingale, 2019). In the following section I
discuss (i) approaches to legitimacy in planning theory and (ii) how efforts to create a common
mobility system are linked with identity creation and group belonging for populists and
commoners.
2.5.1 Legitimacy in planning theory
Discussions about legitimacy in planning theory are replete with comparisons of instrumental
and communicative planning (Sager, 2009; Langmrhy, 2001; Aarsæther, 2018; Flyvbjerg, 1998).
Tensions between these approaches represent one of the biggest trade offs in contemporary
mobility planning. The former focuses on efficient goal achievement, wherein the planner's
legitimacy depends upon their ability to act as ‘visible hands’, correcting for externalities and
market distortions to secure the provision of public goods and services (Langmyhr, 2001). This
approach supports the role of the planner as an expert on how to achieve goals in the most
efficient manner (I bid). Instrumental rationality has played a dominant role in transport
planning (Langmyhr, 2001; Aarsæther, 2018; Sager, 1999)
Frustrated with depoliticization, activists and scholars from the 1990’s onward devised new roles
for planners. The most prominent form of non-instrumental rationality is the communicative
planning paradigm (Healey, 1996). In this framework, the planners’ legitimacy rests upon the
ability to facilitate communication and subvert asymmetrical power dynamics which may
produce inequitable outcomes. Communicative planning expands the notion of procedural justice
beyond the formal rules of representative democracy to include more direct procedures of
participation for people impacted by specific interventions and policies. This approach holds that
citizen participation, ongoing dialogue, time consuming persuasion and even conflict are
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valuable elements of planning which lead to better results. This contrasts with instrumental
rationality where participatory processes are often seen as obstacles to efficient processes (i bid).
Mobility justice scholars argue that for transformations to be progressive, inclusion needs to
happen from the earliest stages of planning processes and forward (Sheller, 2018). However, the
challenges and limitations faced by participatory approaches should not be understated. To be
meaningful, participatory processes require the delegation of power to residents to make
decisions about the trade-offs that shape their built environments (Legacy, 2017). An example of
a value laden trade-off is ‘should the ability of children to play and travel outside safely take
priority over convenience for drivers?’ The practical limits to participation have been well
documented which has implications for the epistemic claims which can be made for it, including
issues around the numbers of people who can engage in a public debate and how long public
engagement can be sustained for longer projects (Mullen et al, 2011; Dryzek, 2001; Legacy,
2017).
Participatory processes also risk becoming oriented towards enrollment as a tool for legitimation
rather than a co-production endeavor in which power is delegated to public actors (Legacy,
2017). One way this can play out is that by the time the public is invited to participate, projects
have often already been formulated. The lack of deep participation is linked with feeling like an
object in planning processes rather than feeling like a subject who has any power to impact the
direction of a plan. Scholars have argued that when people do not feel heard, their confidence in
planners and elected representatives is reduced (Hanssen et al, 2015; Healey, 1996; Mouffe,
2005). This view resonates with wider discussions of popular legitimacy in planning theory and
democratic governance.
2.5.2 Populists and Commoners
In this thesis, I seek to understand how contested efforts to materialize a common urban mobility
system impact social inclusion, thereby reshaping local politics and revealing new questions
about governance and legitimacy. Very recently, some attention has turned toward emergent
populist ruptures and what they mean for planning rationalities. Some scholars have suggested
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that lack of participation and consensus building around low carbon mobility transition policies,
i.e. instrumental rationality, has galvanized populist movements. For example the yellow vest
protests in France and anti-toll protests in Norway (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2021; Tønnesen et al.,
2020). Others note the challenges that populist political ideology poses to communicative
planning and ethics (Sager, 2020). Populism is predicated on a distinction between ‘real’ or
‘regular’ people and ‘elites’ (I bid). There is also an implicit third category of people who don’t
fit the construction of ‘elites’ but also don’t align with the ‘real people’, for example immigrant
communities, LGBTQ communities or alternative social movements. The problem with having
“real people” is that there must then be unreal people (Temelkuran, 2019). “Unreal people” are
excluded from populist claims for social justice and inclusion. A framework or worldview in
which only a portion of the population constitutes authentic people is inherently anti-pluralist
and socially exclusive. Sager (2020) points out that the authoritarian brand of populism is
incommensurable with the ideals of Habermasian conflict resolution, i.e. mutually respectful and
rational discourse, upon which communicative planning is predicated. However, not all populism
is authoritarian and scholars disagree on the relationship between populism and democracy (I
bid). For Mouffe (2013: 236) and Tormey (2018) populism is a symptom of crisis and can have
both positive and negative effects while for Muller (2016) populism is inherently damaging to
liberal democracy.
Group identity is also important to commoning projects. According to commoning scholars,
processes of normalization create ‘common’ social worlds with “often tacit but recognizable
boundaries, within which people share identities, habits and values” (Stravrides 2016: 31). These
“worlds of commoning” (i bid) are built on a sense of group belonging just as the populist
movements discussed in the previous section are. In the commoning literature, commoners are
actors who actively participate in the shaping of rules and boundaries that define the commons in
question, meaning that populist political resistance is also part of commoning processes.
However, the sense of group belonging emphasized in commoning literature is not predicated on
insider/outsider distinctions but rather as a pluralist, open system constituted by partial
connections, alignments of interest and reciprocity. Commoners perform a good life based on
social coordination and shared resources (Singh, 2017).
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2.6 Synthesis and analytical approach
Synthesizing the literature discussed so far to frame my research design, I condense the different
approaches to mobility concepts into the following table.
Table 2: Synthesis of literature review and comparative approach
Key concept Liberal Commoning
Access and
exclusion
The problem is individual capacity to access
mobility   options
Ensure basic min. level of access for
marginalized people
Inclusion focuses on predefined categories of
disadvantage
Access mapped by geographic proximity
The problem is an escalating dynamic of
hypermobility and the expectation of automobility
Rationality is context dependent, inclusion focuses on
dynamic structures facilitating inclusion
Access includes accessing indirect benefits and





Transportation infrastructure seeks to
overcome space
Reduced travel times = economic gains for
individuals and economic growth
Social change is the result of innovations,
technocratic governance & economic growth
Prioritizes the value of  individual freedom and
rational choice
Recognizes the production of space, transportation
infrastructure is seen as urban development
Seeks to reduce travel volumes including leisure travel
by car and plane
Performances of the good life without reliance on
technological innovation




Legitimacy is based on instrumental
rationality: solutions designed and
implemented by experts
Inclusion seeks to fold in marginalized people
into the existing system
Populist ruptures are barriers to transitions
Legitimacy is based on reducing power asymmetries
to allow for a fair negotiation of different values
Inclusion may require restricting the those with the
most resources to support sharing in the urban
commons
Populist ruptures are a crisis of legitimacy
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2.6.1 Dynamic social inclusion
To theorize social inclusion in the context of commoning mobility and sustainability
transformations more broadly, I propose the term ‘dynamic social inclusion’ to account for
shifting norms, practices and provision. Dynamic social inclusion seeks to move beyond safety
net solutions that target disadvantaged individuals and neighborhoods toward structural changes
that affect overall policies and planning activities. This approach to inclusion is still concerned
with improving conditions for the least well off but it is also about changing cultures of mobility
to support collective resource use. It expands from a narrow view of redistribution within the
current system and treats urban mobility systems in terms of social production, necessitating
demanding greater inclusion in planning processes. The figure below represents my analytical
approach for discussing the findings in relation to three conceptual areas integral to mobility and
dynamic social inclusion. Each intervention intersects two of the conceptual areas, guiding the
structure of the discussion in section 6.




I am driven by questions that require a kind of composing and decomposing of the skills and
concepts for investigating them. Thus, I think together with many others in this thesis and tying
everything together into a coherent presentation has been a demanding task. In the previous
section I described many theories which I use to interpret the data from my findings. The
diversity and breadth of ideas I have woven together into the analytical approach is inspired by
methodological insights from STS scholar Donna Harway who said, “Stories reach into and
change each other in their telling. Telling more than one at a time with and through each other is
a way of becoming attuned to stories no one yet knows how to tell, as well as attuned to
remembering stories that have been suppressed or forgotten” (Haraway, 2016: 39). In the
following section I discuss in detail the research design and empirical methods that add primary
data to the ongoing weaving of stories about living and dying together in the anthropocene.
3.1. Case study methodology
Flyvbjerg (2001, 2010) has become a prominent advocate of case study research in the social
sciences and developed a methodology he calls ‘phronetic value research’. The word phronetic
refers to the field of knowledge concerned with values. Phronetic value research is a praxis
oriented methodology which aims to understand the relationship between power and rationality
in concrete decision making processes and “increase the capacity of a variety of human actors to
think and act in value-rational terms” (Flyvberg, 2001: 35). Flyvbjerg argues there is an over
emphasis on scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical know-how (techne) to the point that
those two root words are common tongue while phronesis has fallen out of use. According to
Flyvbjerg (2010), questions germaine to social science such as, ‘how can societies achieve
socially inclusive, sustainable mobility?’ or ‘how can we evaluate judgements and trade-offs?’
belong to the realm of phronesis and cannot be adequately answered through the other forms of
knowledge production.
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By focusing on rationality, power and values through praxis oriented methodology I aim to move
past some of the limitations of existing theories and of social inclusion discussed in the previous
section. The approach in this thesis emerges from post-structuralist thought. Post-structuralists
reject the view that there are objective, a priori values that can be rationally and universally
‘discovered’ and applied. However if we accept that values are socially constructed, we run the
risk of relativism - the view that one set of values is as good as any other. I take the position that
ethics are situational and relational. If it is not possible to derive praxis from first principles, then
praxis is always contingent on context-dependent judgement. The context includes but is not
limited to discourses and formal power structures, temporal, material and financial constraints,
everyday practices and the circumstances in which decisions are taken. Case studies provide the
best method for describing and explaining the contexts which shape the practical rationalities
from which actors judge situations because judgement itself is cultivated through exposure to
‘cases’ and experiences in real life (Flyvbjerg, 2010).
Because social systems are emergent, complex and dynamic, I understand social inclusion as a
contingent quality produced through relations and not by discrete events or decisions.
Accordingly, I analyze the networked relations between interventions to reveal inclusion impacts
that may be obscured by a narrower focus. This approach helps prevent inadvertently creating or
entrenching injustices in one area through addressing an issue in another area. This approach is
further supported by the praxis of strategic urban planning. The relationships between what
currently exists (infrastructure, mobility patterns, socioeconomic differences, etc) and visions of
the city’s future constitute the space in which everyday lives unfold. One of the strengths of case
studies is that they can offer ‘thick descriptions’ focused on context (Flyvbjerg, 2010). A ‘thick
description’ involves using qualitative methods to describe not only observable human actions
but the contexts in which those actions were taken as interpreted by different actors (Geertz,
1973). A case study is thus appropriate to investigating my research aims regarding social
inclusion within mobility system transformations.
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3.2. Research design
I conducted the fieldwork between August 2020 and March 2021. During 2020 this research
overlapped with a research project called Just Mobility Transitions (JUST MOB) where I worked
as a research assistant, and during early 2021 with a research project called Responsive
Organising for Low Emission Societies (ROLES) where I was employed in a similar capacity
with a conceptual and empirical focus on just mobility transitions in Bergen. The initial stage of
the research involved collecting and analyzing policy and planning documents as well as local
news media to identify relevant issues and actors. The local media outlets I drew from were
primarily Bergens Tidende and Bergens Avisen. I searched for articles related to the mobility
transition going back three years and closely monitored related stories during the research period
Aug 2020 - March 2021.From this initial mapping I identified key areas to investigate further
through focus groups with residents. I also mapped the responsibilities for different elements of
the mobility system using government websites and requested interviews with relevant planners,
policy makers and advisors.
Departing from the broad aim to investigate social justice issues related to the mobility transition
in Bergen, I narrowed down the focus over time to social inclusion and three interventions aimed
at reducing private vehicles. The research question is derived from the current city government’s
political platform which states social inclusion as a goal together with reducing private vehicles
(Bergen Municipality, 2019). In addition, social exclusion related to the interventions is one of
the primary reasons for contesting them as stated in the anti-toll political platform and in the
party’s engagement with local media. Finally, my literature review identified social inclusion as a
primary goal within sustainable mobility transitions but the literature also identifies a need for
deeper theorization of this dimension (Beyazit, 2017; Lucas, 2012; Verlinghieri and Schwanen,
2020; Enright, 2019; Levinson 2010, 2019).
The research question cannot be answered definitively, but I strive to clarify and deliberate the
issues at stake and develop partial answers which contribute to the dialogue about problems,
risks, goals and what might be possible in urban transition planning. I accomplish this through
providing concrete examples and a detailed narrative of the ways in which power and values
work in the formal future making processes at the urban scale, and with what consequences. The
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goal is to provide input to ongoing processes and deliberations rather than generate ultimate,
universally verifiable knowledge about the nature of social organizations.
The research process was iterative and abductive. Inductive approaches to research begin from
empirical observations of the world and then move towards hypotheses and theory building
(Douven, 2017). In deductive methods, the researcher departs from a theoretical framework,
develops hypotheses and then produces empirics. I did not depart from one specific theory or
define hypotheses I wished to falsify but aimed instead to develop a deeper understanding of
how social inclusion goals are operationalized in mobility transitions literature and practices, and
of how the large-scale transformations of sociospatial dynamics change the meaning of social
inclusion. I used existing theories of social inclusion and mobility systems to guide my
investigation and then used the findings to revisit and nuance theories of social inclusion and
mobility transitions. Cycling between inductive and deductive methods is the abductive method
(Douven, 2017), which represents the approach I employed.
3.2.1 The case
To gain a better understanding of the possible social implications of policies for de-centering
automobility, I investigate the mobility transition Bergen, Norway. The case is bounded by
concern for social inclusion impacts on residents of the functional urban area of Bergen, Norway.
A functional urban area includes the dense center of a city together with its ‘commuting zone’
which encompasses the daily movements of people (Dijkstra et al, 2019). Bergen has several
characteristics that make it a generative case for my inquiry. First, thanks to plentiful
hydroelectric power the energy grid is already low carbon which was a selling point for
advocates of electric vehicles. Due to generous state subsidies, Bergen became the first city in
the world to pass 20% of the car fleet being electric in 2020 (Urbanet, 2020b). The current city
government is also pursuing an aggressive agenda to reduce private vehicle traffic. While the
state sponsored target for Norwegian cities is zero growth in private vehicles, the 2019 political
platform for Bergen’s city council set an ambitious agenda to reduce car traffic by 30 percent of
the 2019 levels by 2023 (Bergen Municipality, 2019). The vision articulated in the platform is to
create a socially inclusive, low carbon mobility system by prioritizing walking, cycling and
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public transportation. The policies designed to achieve this vision are hotly contested in the
public discourse and recently through the ballot box in the last city council elections.
The overall case studied in this thesis is Bergen's mobility transition. This is a case of a low
carbon, urban mobility transition in which cars are deprioritized. I reviewed policy documents
and news media to identify three interlinked interventions that are salient focal points in the
changing constellation of mobility politics in Bergen: light rail expansion, road tolls and car free
zones. These represent the embedded subunits of analysis. Thus, the research design is an
embedded, single case study.
3.2.2 The subunits of analysis
The three interventions were chosen for several reasons. First, the choice to study three
interventions rather than one or five for example. Including no more than three was both a
practical and a strategic choice because the chosen three are the most polarizing elements of the
mobility transition and the most directly targeted at restricting car use, not just offering an
alternative. If I had studied only one intervention it would have been car free zones. However,
the car free zone in the city center has already been studied and does not provide an opportunity
to discuss wider dynamics of inclusion and urban/suburban conflict. The suburban car free zones
do not exist yet so while I was able to collect data on the policy design and planning process, I
would not have been able to say anything about actual social inclusion impacts.
The light rail and the road tolls are too entangled for it to make any sense in studying the social
inclusion impacts of only one with my analytical approach of dynamic social inclusion.
Furthermore, a comprehensive mixed methods study of social exclusion impacts from the tolls
was already published by Norconsult in 2020 and it thus made sense to build on these findings
rather than attempt to confirm or challenge them at this time, especially since I have considerably
less resources than the team that completed that study.If I had studied only the light rail, the
study would have turned into a study of mobility and land use or housing justice which was not
the goal of the research project.
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Ultimately, I was looking for systems perspective on urban mobility transitions and how
interventions and social inclusion impacts are interlinked. I could have included more than three
interventions, such as cycling infrastructure or bus provision. While there are some conflict over
particular projects, the principle of cycling infrastructure is not particularly contested in the
public discourse and it doesn’t directly restrict car drivers or change the character of
neighborhoods like the light rail. Bus provision did not fit the design of investigating
interventions governed by municipal policy makers and planners. The busses are the purview of
regional authorities. Bus routes and their administrative control comes up in the findings as an
explanation for why the municipal spatial plan for densification is so tightly linked with the light
rail, but the data is from the municipal actors perspective. I could have presented findings from
an interview with a representative of the regional bus provider, Skyss or conversations with the
bus drivers during a strike they held in September, 2020 but I chose to maintain focus on the
urban scale and how the light rail impacts social inclusion. Park and rides are another element
that I considered including in the study but they, too, are barely ever brought up in the public
discourse or challenged on principle compared to the three interventions I chose. Furthermore,
almost all of them are administered by regional authorities and the regional bus provider.
I made a similar choice to use observations from the National mobility conference but not direct
interviews with actors on the national scale. I became interested in the formal discourse around
transport planning at the national scale because municipal planners expressed frustration with the
Public Roads Administration and in particular plans to build mega road projects into the city. The
Public Roads Administration is an actor at the municipal scale in the sense that they are
responsible for some roads in and around the city and in that they sign the Urban Growth
Agreement together with municipal actors. However, the ‘thick description’ I develop in this
thesis is primarily about the subjective contexts that urban actors of all kinds take action in. Part
of that context is the material consequences of the mega road projects and the discourses that
support building them. The mobility conference provided me with an excellent opportunity to
observe the discourse at the national scale that partially shapes the context of urban actors and
the mobility transition in Bergen.
Finally, I decided to include the car free zones instead of focusing solely on the tolls and the light
rail for two reasons. The first is the contrast between the discourse at the national level and the
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discourse around car free zones with regard to social change. The former seeks to instigate social
change through massive infrastructures that reduce travel times between cities through
technological innovations such as building the longest and deepest undersea tunnel in the world
(Davik, 2020). The promised economic growth and widespread societal benefits are refuted by
researchers but the story lives. Car free zones, especially the plan to distribute them throughout
the suburbs offers a deep contrast. Here, the hope is to plant the seeds of social transformation
through making space for low carbon logics. No technological innovation or massive financial
investment required. The second reason was a novel opportunity to study the planning process in
the early stages. The planners were positive towards working with researchers and I was able to
organize a co-production workshop with them in a relatively short amount of time.
In conclusion, the choice of the case and the three interventions were a combination of feasibility
(in the midst of a global pandemic) and strategy. All three interventions directly challenge the
historically prioritized, collective provision of infrastructure for automobility and therefore may
provide insights for the many other cities considering pursuing a car free or car lite future. Also
for this reason, they have been hotly contested in the public discourse which is another important
justification for studying them. In the last municipal elections, a new, populist political party
called ‘the people’s action against tolls’ won third place (Wanvik and Haarstad, 2021). The party
claims that the policies aimed at restricting private vehicle use, especially the three interventions
studied in this thesis, are unjust and socially exclusive towards those who are already the most
disadvantaged. Accounting for and addressing this resistance is a crucially important element in
the politics of urban sustainability transitions.
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3.3 Methods and data sources
I employed multiple qualitative methods to triangulate and complement the strengths and
weaknesses of each.
Table 3: Overview of methods




Identify formal statements of intention, understand the overall
vision for the city and the underlying value and assumptions
that are communicated
Local media & consultant
reports (Secondary)
Identify mobility justice issues and perceptions in the public
debate, make use of secondary data from consultant reports
commissioned by the city using mixed methods to establish
facts about mobility justice claims in the public debate
Focus groups Elucidate lived experiences and perceptions of social inclusion
and mobility issues from city residents
Semi-structured interviews To access subjective experiences and perspectives from actors




To observe the primary forum for the future of mobility leading
up to the new national transport plan with top government
officials (elected and appointed) giving presentations and
responding to researchers challenging their claims
Participant observation
(CFZ workshop)
To work together with municipal planners to brainstorm ideas
for public participation in the new suburban car free zones and




The interviews reveal everyday practices and bounded rationalities that shape the way projects
actually unfold. Interviews were necessary to understand how actors involved in planning and
policy formulation operationalize social inclusion and what elements come into and shape
trade-offs in decision making and planning processes. I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews
with a total 25 informants between August 2020 and March 2021 (see appendix A). The majority
were conducted online due to pandemic restrictions. I designed interview guides based on
background research into informants roles and previously published statements when relevant
but remained flexible to follow up on topics interviewees brought up.
The interviews focused on issues related to the zero growth target and specifically the three key
interventions designed to achieve it: light rail expansion, tolls and car free zones. I particularly
focused the informant's attention on issues related to social inclusion and change over time in the
practices and rationalities governing Bergen’s mobility system. I aimed to surface the details of
specific experiences, perceptions of fairness and conflict, and relationships between sectors and
system components.Nearly all the interviews included times when the interviewee would clarify
whether they were sharing a personal opinion or the stance of the organization they represented. I
noted these clarifications and presented the findings accordingly.
I employed purposive or strategic sampling to identify informants. I identified prospects from
organizational charts, government websites, planning and policy documents, newspaper articles,
and social media. The interviewees were primarily selected on the basis of their specific
first-hand knowledge of the mobility policies and planning practices in Bergen. The 20
interviewees included local and county government politicians and officials from Bergen
municipality, as well as a few municipal officials from neighbouring municipalities, policy
advisors, mobility and spatial planners, a representative of the Norwegian social housing bank,
private sector property developers and architects, the chamber of commerce, community
representatives and other interest groups. At the end of every interview I asked if they knew of
anyone else I should talk to, adding snowballing to the initial strategic sampling.
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3.3.2 Focus Groups
I held three focus groups with residents of Bergen. Participants were recruited through social
media, print announcements distributed on the university campus and key mobility hubs in the
city and a snowballing approach using multiple existing local networks. I offered two tickets to
the local cinema for participation. In total there were 17 participants. Females were
disproportionately represented with only two male participants.
Each focus group lasted one hour. I guided discussions with prepared, open ended questions on
different mobility topics designed to start conversations. I also included activities such as a word
association where I introduced a controversial topic and encouraged participants to call out
words that came to mind while I wrote them on a white board. We then discussed the
constellation of words. For the second activity I passed out maps of Bergen with yellow and red
markers and asked participants to color areas they feel are easily accessible in yellow and areas
that they avoid traveling in red.
3.3.3 Participant observation: Car free zone workshop with planners
Following a conversation with two municipal planners responsible for selecting locations and
initiating participatory processes for designing the CFZs in the suburbs, we decided to hold a
workshop with their team and other planners working on related projects. In total there were ten
participants from municipal planning offices including some who have expertise in the ‘Plan and
Building’ law (a keystone legal framework for Norwegian development) and worked with the
spatial plan (Bergen municipality, 2019b) and some who have been working with car free zones
in Bergen center. All ten were female. I invited two researchers with expertise in car free zones
to give short presentations, one from the University of Bergen’s climate and energy
transformations center and one from the transport economic institute based in Oslo. In addition,
three colleagues who research urban transportation were in attendance, one moderated the
workshop and the other two were participant observers like myself.
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3.3.4 Observation: Mobility conference
Multiple municipal planners indicated in interviews that planned mega road projects in the
national transport plan designed by the Public Roads Administration were expected to have
negative impacts on social inclusion and the city’s target to reduce the number of private
vehicles. I therefore looked up the national transport plan and learned there was a national
conference organized by the government leading up to it’s release during my field work period.
All the major actors in national transport planning, including the minister of transport, the
director of the transport economics institute, the director of the public roads administration and
the director of ‘New Roads’ would be giving statements or presentations. New Roads is the
private company dependent on state tenders created to stimulate competition with the Public
Roads Administration consonant with neoliberal logics. Of particular interest was that two
researchers in transport economics would be presenting data challenging the claims used to
justify the mega road projects my interviewees identified as a major goal conflict. The final
comments from the director of the Public Roads Administration, in response to the researchers,
directly referred to social inclusion as the primary justification for the road projects.
3.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the data
3.4.1. Validity
“Social science doesn’t prove things but it can learn things” (Flyvbjerg 2010: 223).
The broad range of informants I spoke with improves the reliability of the responses and my
interpretation of them. Several of the interviews are not used directly in the thesis but the insights
I gained helped shape my overall impression of the complexities involved. Also, there were
‘boundary’ informants in the sense that I wanted to keep expanding the sphere of inquiry until I
reached relatively irrelevant informants (with regards to social inclusion and the three
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interventions I focus on) in order to ensure that my net was wide enough to capture the
intricacies of my case study.
I made some attempts to interview single moms who do not own cars, reaching five through my
own personal network as a mother without a car. Ultimately, I decided that sampling through my
personal network, the low number of informants, and most importantly the fact that the
informants were already aware of my own opinions on the matter and could be reasonably
expected to say what I wanted to hear, all amounted to a biased account. Therefore, I have not
presented any findings from these interviews.
The focus group data has three primary weaknesses. First, there were only two males out of 17
participants. Second there were only 17 participants and recruiting more people was a challenge
due to shifting restrictions due to the Covid pandemic. Third, no participants supported the
anti-toll party. This may have been due to the method of recruitment which may not have
reached that demographic. Another possible reason is a potential inverse relationship between
willingness to participate in academic focus groups conducted at the center for climate and
energy transformations and willingness to support a populist movement defending ‘the right to
drive’ in the city. I would have liked to collect more data on perspectives and experiences from
people who voted for the anti-toll party but the pandemic limited the opportunities. For example,
I had planned to attend the party’s annual meeting but it was cancelled.
3.4.2. Generalizability and transferability
In the essay, 5 Misunderstandings about Case Studies, the first misunderstanding is that
generalizable, context independent knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical, context
dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2010: 224). This misunderstanding is based on the prestige
given to predictive theories and universals but I depart from the position that these cannot be
found in the study of human social affairs. On generalizing from case studies, Flyvbjerg (2010:
226) emphasized,
“Finally, it should be mentioned that formal generalization, whether on the basis of large
samples or single cases, is considerably overrated as the main source of scientific
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progress. (...) Thomas Kuhn (1987) has shown that the most important precondition for
science is that researchers possess a wide range of practical skills for carrying out
scientific work. Generalization is just one of these”.
As far as transferability, Bergen is a small to medium sized city which is an identifier held in
common with a plethora of other places across the world. I have endeavored to develop the
theory of social inclusion and social change in addition to conducting time intensive empirical
work to provide a rich case study description. Doing this work in a city on the forefront of a
large-scale mobility transition like Bergen may enable planners, practitioners, activists and
researchers concerned with transitions elsewhere to more readily identify and compare key
dynamics. Understanding these and the associated social inclusion dimensions is necessary to
anticipate, circumvent and address transport injustice issues as they arise and before they
exacerbate existing inequalities or stall a transition. It is my ambition that the partial answers and
questions about the possible social inclusion implications of mobility policies and the politics of
transitions presented in this thesis may contribute to theorizing and practicing processes of
solidarity building and legitimation that support inclusive and rapid decarbonization.
3.4.3. Positionality
I was already based in Bergen before the field work began and I was familiar with the city and
the local culture. I also speak Norwegian which made it easier to follow local media stories, read
planning and policy documents and interview informants who preferred to speak Norwegian.
Although I am not originally from Norway, I consider myself an ‘insider’ with regard to this
research (Mullings, 1999). However, as a professional academic who does not drive, I was
considered an outsider by the representative of the anti-toll party. Also as a mother who does not
own a car I was particularly sensitive to representations of mothers in discourses and claims that
full participation in society for mothers requires a car.
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3.5 Ethical issues
The basic principles of ethical social science research are to: avoid harm to participants, ensure
informed consent of participants, respect the privacy of participants and avoid the use of
deception (Skilbrei, 2019). First, no participant was under the age of 18. The greater the
vulnerability of participants or impacted communities, the greater the responsibility of the
researcher to protect them. I did not identify any of the people I interviewed or that participated
in the focus groups as particularly vulnerable and requiring special efforts to protect beyond
standard anonymization where appropriate.
The focus group participants were informed that the sessions would be recorded and transcribed
but not shared with anyone or made public. Participants signed up voluntarily based on a
publicly circulated invitation to participate, and had a chance to acquaint themselves with details
of the larger research project prior to participation, and to withdraw if they so wished.
I typed notes during the interviews. All interviewees were asked how they would like to be
referred to in the thesis and any other output.
In order to avoid one form of deception, I was clear about how much time I requested for
interviews and focus groups and stuck to the time limits agreed upon. This means the focus
groups did not go longer than one hour and interviews ended precisely at the length we
previously agreed upon.
3.6 Summary
I have introduced the relevance and scope of this case study for policy and theory building. In
short, it constitutes an empirically grounded exploration of social inclusion within large scale
transformations to urban mobility systems. Next, the section on case background provides
relevant geographical, demographic, and administrative details for Bergen pertaining to the low




“The mountains are the most powerful planners in Bergen” (municipal planner 03.09.2020).
Bergen city center is surrounded by mountains on all sides except the opening to the sea. Tendrils
of habitation snake away from the center through valleys between the mountains and along the
coast line. The center struggles with air pollution problems associated with the topography and
emissions from transportation including land and sea vehicles (Høiskar et al, 2017). The
photograph below depicts the central central valley of Bergen.
Figure 2. Bergen city center. Source: Marco Franchino, 2007
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Bergen has a population of about 280,000 inhabitants and is expected to grow by about 2,000
inhabitants a year2. At the same time, relative population growth in neighboring municipalities is
projected to grow at even higher rates contributing to increased numbers of commuters into the
city. Jobs are located in three primary areas, the two center districts, one of which holds the
largest single employer - the hospital, and an industrial park where the international airport is
located. Relatively few jobs are located outside of these areas. The suburbs are referred to
throughout this thesis. They are not homogenous but defined through not being the two central
districts (Bergenhus and Årstad). This distinction is found in policy documents as well as in
popular discourse related to place belonging and the distribution of resources and services. There
are six official areas (suburbs) in addition to the two central ones. With the exception of Arna,
the smallest and most peripheral suburb, the populations of each area range approximately
between 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants within a margin of 2,500.
4.2 Governing context and transport planning
The overall governing context in Norway includes a historically strong social contract,
commitment to affirmative action, resistance to elite capture (Aarsæther, 2018). Since 2015, the
conservative right coalition of the national government has pursued a neoliberal agenda called
the ‘de-bureaucratization and effictivization reform’. The reform has resulted in restructuring and
centralization as well as annual budget cuts between .5 to .8 percent across all state institutions
and enterprises, hitting welfare institutions the hardest (FAFO, 2019; Jansen, 2020). Sager (2009)
described tensions between the instrumental rationality of new public management favored by
the current national government in Norway and the communicative approaches planners are
trained in, concluding that the values held by municipal planners are often at odds with the
neoliberal inflected rationality of the national government; “important elements of the typical
attitudes of Nordic planners correspond to the ideals and values embedded in communicative
planning. Private and market-oriented development is regarded with considerable scepticism”
(Sager, 2009: 75).
2 Norwegian Bureau of Statistics: https://www.ssb.no/kommunefakta/bergen
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4.2.1 Zero growth target
The overarching policy guiding mobility policies in Norwegian cities is the zero growth target.
The zero growth target states that private vehicle use should not increase even as the populations
of Norwegian cities are growing. Instead, transport needs should be met by public transportation,
walking and cycling (White Paper 26, 2012-2013). The goal is the premise for funding
allocations dictated through the Urban Growth Agreement (UGA). The UGA is signed by cities,
the State and the national roads department. The UGA dictates how funds generated from tolls
can be allocated including directing a portion towards public transportation infrastructure and
operating costs, cycle paths and a number of other projects. Assessing these agreements,
Westskog and co-authors (2020: 554) found that they are “framed by complex underlying
structures of roles and powers, which challenge the working and legitimacy of the governance
structures”. The UGA that Bergen signed with the Ministry of Transport gave the city ample
funds for infrastructure projects, but also integrated decision making in a complex set of
decisions and obligations that could not easily be disentangled.
4.2.2 Transport pyramid
Achieving the zero growth target entails major structural shifts in the spatial organization of the
city and it’s mobility system. The image below depicts the desired hierarchy of transport mode
splits in Bergen’s mobility strategy (Bergen municipality, 2016).
Figure 3: The Bergen Transport Pyramid. Source: Bergen municipality, 2016: 36
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Walking is placed at the top with the biggest share, followed by cycling (including electric
bikes), then public transportation, then car sharing and private vehicles at the very bottom. The
pyramid represents a reversal of the recent past when car drivers were prioritized. This entails
systemic change and necessarily disrupts established sectoral interests, planning processes and
priorities. Emission reduction goals are bulwarked through corollary goals of transforming
Bergen into an active city characterised by inclusive, citizen-centric public space. The trajectory
is pointed in the right direction but the progress thus far doesn’t reflect the extent of the city's
ambition. Further interventions are required to accelerate the transition in line with a 30%
reduction in private vehicle use from 2019 levels by 2023 (Bergen Municipality, 2019a).
4.3 Modal profile of transport in Bergen
Around 1.2 million trips are taken daily in the Bergen region. Car traffic into the center was 6%
lower in 2017 than in 2015 and 20% lower in 2017 than in 1990. The number of trips taken on
public transport has doubled between 2010 and 2017 (from 27 million to 56 million) (Miljøløftet,
2020). These numbers are based on paid trips, the company operating public transport (Skyss)
estimates that during Corona, one in four trips were not paid for so the number of trips on public
transport are likely higher than the official account. Walking represents the second largest share
of trips (24%) followed by public transportation (18%) and cyclists (4%) (Urbanet, 2020a).
Public transportation includes busses, light rail, ferries and scheduled boats. There have been
modest shifts in the proportion of modes over the last six years with cycling and public transport
increasing by 1 and 3 percent respectively and walking and private vehicle use decreasing each
by 2 %. Within private vehicles there has been a substantial increase in electric vehicles which
grew from 3% of the car fleet in 2014 to 24% in 2019 (Urbanet, 2020b).
The following figure illustrates the distribution of travel modes for daily trips. Gray represents
driving, yellow is being a passenger in a car, light blue is public transportation, dark blue is
walking, orange is cycling and the green sliver is motorcycles.
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Figure 4. Diagram of travel mode distribution for daily trips. Source: Urbanet, 2020a.
4.4 Mobility politics in Bergen
Bergen is experiencing growing polarization around the politics of mobility. While the changes
aimed at preventing growth in private vehicle use have been welcomed by many (Tvinnereim et
al, 2020), they have also sparked controversy most noticeably in the form of a new political party
called the ‘People’s Movement – No To More Road Tolls’ (hereafter referred to as the anti-toll
party). The anti-toll party argues that tolls exacerbate differences between city center and
suburban residents, and penalize economically vulnerable groups [interviewed 27.10.2020]. In
the last local election, the new party formed just months prior came in third place with 18 percent
of the vote and notable popularity in suburban areas. Meanwhile the other young party, ‘The
environmental party - the greens’ (hereafter referred to as ‘the greens’), won the majority in the
city center. Both the well established parties, the Conservative Party (Høyre) and the Labour
Party (Arbeider partiet) still won the majority but lost substantial support. The following figure
shows the 2019 electoral map and key. H stands for the conservative right party, Ap stands for
the centrist labour party, FNB stands for ‘The people’s action - no to more toll roads’ and MDG
stands for ‘The environmental party - the greens’.
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Figure 5. Electoral map and key for the 2019 city council elections. Source: NRK
As the map demonstrates, the greens won the majority of the votes in the most central district
while the ani-toll party won the outer edges of the municipality. The success of the anti-toll party
in those areas may be attributed to the impact of the new toll stations installed in 2019. Before
that, residents of the outer suburbs paid substantially less in tolls than households in the inner
suburb (Norconsult 2020). The greens won just 10% of the total votes but now holds the seat on
the city council for environment, climate and urban development. The city center doesn’t have
more people than the other administrative areas, and together the suburbs have several times the
number of people as the city center. The anti-toll party points to this as evidence that residents in
the center have too much power compared to residents of the suburbs.
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5. Analysis
I structure the presentation and interpretation of data in the form of a section for each of the three
interventions I investigated: light rail expansion, congestion tolls and car free zones. Together
they seek to prevent growth in private vehicle use and establish a common urban mobility system
that is low carbon and socially inclusive. The social inclusion aspect is contested in multiple
ways.
5.1 Light rail expansion
5.1.1 Background
Plans for a light rail in Bergen have existed since the 1970s and it was first officially proposed in
the 1990s (Vollset et al, 2007). During this period and into the 2000s, tolls were used to finance
massive investment in infrastructure projects for cars. Despite this, or more probably because of
it, congestion continued to increase (i bid). In 2005 it was decided to begin construction of the
light rail and the first line opened in 2010 with 15 stations. Today, the state covers 40% of the
cost as part of the UGA, contingent on meeting goals to prevent growth in private vehicles.
The light rail departs every 5 minutes during rush hour and has a capacity which correlates to
around 90 busses (Miljøloøftet, 2020). On average, between 40,000 and 50,000 people travel on
it every day. A 2013 travel survey revealed that the light rail had changed the distribution of
transport modes in the corridor it runs through (Bergensprogrammet, 2017). The portion of trips
between the areas of Bergenhus (the center), Årstad (the center), Fana, and Ytrebygda increased
from 19% in 2008 to 28% in 2013 (i bid). The same survey revealed a decrease in the portion of
trips taken with a car in Bergen for the first time in several decades. The light rail is the primary
mode of transport for 14% of the trips between the four areas mentioned above (Miljøløftet,
2020).
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5.1.2 Light rail politics
Several informants described the last two city council elections as ‘light rail elections’. The
politics of urban mobility in Bergen are hotly debated in public forums, with the light rail and the
congestion tolls that partially finance it, the centerpieces of the debate. Several different groups
have organized public demonstrations to support the light rail over the years. Leading up to the
city council elections in 2019, there were demonstrations against the light rail by the anti-toll
party. At least two groups organized counter demonstrations; ‘Bergen’s Mothers’ and ‘The
Grandparents Climate Action’.
Figure 6. ‘Bergen’s Mothers’ logo. Source: Nhu Diep
Bergen’s mothers brought a feminist dimension to the political engagement around the light rail3.
They argued that the tolls were getting too much attention in the public debate and sought to
refocus attention on the light rail. There were several critical responses to the demonstrations4
including a representative from the right wing, neoliberal, “progress” party who told local
journalists that his concern is for “all the grandchildren of these mothers that will have to use
large sums of money on the light rail, that is our dilemma. We are concerned with the grand
4 A representative from the right party said “the mothers should rather be concerned with getting money
from the state to finance the light rail instead of supporting the tolls policy”. However, a group of women




childrens economy”5. Meanwhile, Bergen’s mothers and the Grandparents Climate Action argue
that they stand in solidarity with young people around the world demanding policies and
infrastructure that improve ecological sustainability.
The image below shows two photos. In the bottom left corner is an anti-toll protest with banners
hung on trucks that say “Enough is enough” and the larger photo shows a counter protest on the
same day organized by the ‘Grandparents Climate Action’ with signs that read “Enough is
enough! Stop the exhaust comrades”, “More light rail, More city”, and “The children’s climate is
our cause”.
Figure 7. Protests and counter protests related to tolls and the light rail. Source: NRK
The protests and counter protests illustrate political engagement outside of formal processes to
impact the direction of urban development. All the dissenting opinions are a part of the processes
of producing space, commoning mobility and the right to the city.
Back in the offices of city hall, formal debates and votes finalize decisions about urban
development. The municipal planners I interviewed emphasized the role of the light rail as an
5 see debate here: https://www.ba.no/politikerne-far-nye-kraftsalver-fra-bergens-modre/s/5-8-1115305
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urban development project rather than simply a transportation project. One mobility planner
[interviewed 26.10.2020] explained there was a political debate about whether to prioritize the
fastest possible travel times from major hubs to the center or whether providing access to the
largest number of people within ten minutes of walking distance should be the priority. The latter
perspective won in the end. The planner emphasized that frequent stops make the light rail more
socially inclusive and contribute to overall urban development rather than a strict focus on rapid
commuter transport.
Social inclusion and accessibility are not only addressed through distributed stops but also
through universal design. Municipal planners emphasized that an inclusive mobility system
should be “Universally designed, not particularly affected by private actors, economically
accessible for everyone, and holistically designed” [interviewed 22.10.2020]. Universal design is a
concept for the design of buildings, products, services and environments that aims to make them
accessible to all people regardless of age, disability or other factors. The foundational idea is that
the built environment should be designed to be as inclusive as possible. Universal design differs
from the concept of accessibility in that the goal is to avoid specialized solutions for specific
groups, for example ramp extensions on busses for wheelchair users. Mobility planners pointed
out universal design features of the light rail such as the smooth surface between the platform
and the train, and predictable design for the platforms and door locations across different
stations. The spatial planners pointed out that “accessibility is often reduced to wheelchair users
but we also think about children and elderly, safety and ease of use for everyone” [interviewed
22.10.2020].
5.1.3 The power dynamics of light rail driven densification
The light rail is the basis for the municipality’s master plan for spatial zoning (Bergen
municipality, 2019b). Three senior planners responsible for the spatial plan explained that “the
spatial politics of the municipal plan is to build up around public service provision” and “the
light rail is the backbone of the cities spatial plan” [interviewed 22.10.2020]. In 2019, a new
zoning plan was approved for the city which signaled strong commitment to densification around
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the light rail and deprioritizing private vehicles through strict limits to allocating space for
parking in new developments. The new zoning plan is expected to reduce the demand for
transport substantially as well as stimulate modal shifts from cars to the light rail. Municipal
planners cited a report commissioned by the municipality which found that the new spatial plan
is projected to reduce growth in transport by 40-45% relative to projections based on the plan
from 2010 (Rambøll, 2017 ).
The municipality regulates the light rail but doesn’t have any control over the bus routes. This
administrative arrangement was identified by the spatial planners as the reason the zoning plan is
so tightly linked with the light rail [interviewed 22.10.2020]. The planners informed me that the
regional bus operator participates in project groups sometimes but they answer to regional
authorities not municipal. The city spatial planners expressed that if bus routes were planned and
provisioned at the municipal level they could design new housing areas with complementary
busses. However, since that is not the case they rely heavily on densification around the light rail.
They emphasized that bus routes can be changed relatively quickly and easily compared to the
more permanent infrastructure guiding the light rail.
The new, light rail driven zoning plan was highly contentious. The business community,
including developers and the Bergen Chamber of Commerce, protested vigorously against it.
Opposition politicians from the right wing side of the spectrum claimed the plan was illegal but
their appeal to regional authorities lost6. The plan mandates that new developments will be
restricted to seven zones that are already built up. The intention is to stimulate compact urban
development and prevent further sprawl. This essentially re-zoned areas that had previously been
zoned for residential development, scrapping plans developers had been advancing. In addition
to placing undue burdens on the commercial developers, they argued, this would increase
housing prices and put home ownership in the city centre out of reach for many.
A city council member described the new spatial plan as a shift in development paths from a
“city of chance driven by lobbyism” towards “knowledge based, long term planning”
[Interviewed 04.11.2020]. The more rigid plan marks the end of an era when lobbyists from
developers could circumvent democratic and technocratic processes and influence politicians to
decide in their favor. An architect and economist working for a property developer stated that
6 https://www.bt.no/nyheter/lokalt/i/LAmPLp/opposisjonspolitikere-mener-bergens-nye-arealplan-er-ulovlig
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lobbyists, “used to be able to ring up politicians, get a meeting and explain why your project is
important to get it reviewed. That’s not possible anymore after the new spatial plan was adopted,
concessions are way harder to get” [interviewed 23.10.2020]. He added that today politicians
rely on technical expertise within the municipality to navigate the complexities of planning
dilemmas on the case list of city council meetings. This resonates with the emphasis made by a
current political representative at the city council who argued that when there is more space for
discretion the politicians get more power, while when frameworks are more rigid, technical
experts have more power [interviewed 06.11.2020]. As further noted by a political
representative at the county committee for transport and mobility, their decisions are based on
the input from the technical experts and the need to balance budgets” [interviewed 30.10.2020].
In the current system, public planners design zoning systems based on democratically
determined trajectories and the private sector is responsible for 80 - 90 % of the project plans.
According to spatial planners, at the scale of detailed plans, public planners are mostly case
workers, saying yes or no to proposals rather than developing projects themselves [interviewed
22.10.2020]. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that their knowledge-based
recommendations have more influence over political decisions than they did before the new
spatial plan [interviewed 15.10.2020; 22.10.2020; 27.10.2020; 04.11.2020]. The architect and
economist working for a private developer said “the new plan is so detailed and technical that the
amateur politicians have to rely on the expert opinions, giving them more power” [interviewed
27.10.2020]. The head of business policy for the chamber of commerce was even more emphatic,
stating that “Bergen is run technocratically by bureaucrats” (referring to professional planners)
[interviewed 23.10.2020]. However, politicians still have the final say and can potentially
overrule recommendations from planners in many cases.
In the past year since the new spatial plan was approved, the political interpretation has been
even stricter than the professional planners. As a political advisor explained, “The politicians
own the spatial plan, they are ultimately responsible for it” and “they have to show that they
mean it” [interviewed 04.11.2020]. Several proposals that received positive feedback from the
agencies have been shot down by the city council development committee. The city development
committee has also disregarded expert opinions when they are initiated by citizen complaints.
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There have been active debates about problems related to light rail densification in local media7.
These debates are part of larger questions about the social impact of compact city development
as it is currently being pursued. commentators point out that the municipalities desire for
densification aligns very well with the developers desire to maximize profits by building small,
low quality apartments that are very expensive.
A recent conflict in an area undergoing rapid property development due to a light rail stop
exemplifies issues at other current and proposed stops, each leading to large scale changes of
land use and the character of places. These conflicts reinforce growing popular resentment
towards a sustainable development agenda that appears to lack reflexivity or concern for people's
everyday lives. After complaints from the residents of one neighborhood impacted by light rail
driven developments, Skjold, a panel of municipal experts (fagetaten) reviewed the situation and
together with the national road department recommended a ‘building stop’ in response to
undesirable effects emerging from large scale private development projects. The city council
committee for development denied the request. The representative for the greens, in the seat for
urban development, explained that there were similar complaints at several other stops, and that
approving a building stop at Skjold could undermine the strategy for densification along the light
rail8. This instance resonates with what the policy advisor working between the planning
agencies and the politicians articulated above, the current city government is taking an even
stricter line than the expert recommendations.
5.1.4 Gentrification
Private investment along the light rail far exceeds the cost of the light rail itself according to the
calculations of the Bergen Development Corporation (Wågsæther et al, forthcoming). The Light
Rail corporation, as well as pro-Light Rail politicians, point to this as proof of the success of the
Light Rail. The negative side of this from an inclusion perspective, is that it increases property
values and housing prices in areas with access to the Light Rail. While local government can




ensure that property prices are such that the most convenient locations in this new system are
accessible to all. The anti-toll party argued repeatedly in the election campaign that these policies
are multiplying privilege [interviewed 27.10.2020]. The spatial planners also expressed concerns
about housing justice,
“it is a huge challenge. We must make it possible for people to live centrally, with quality,
now and in 50 years. But the planning and building act is not a tool that deals with
finance. We need other tools to help people into the housing market” [interviewed
22.10.2020].
Within a highly liberalized housing market there are few effective policy instruments available to
ensure that developers build housing for everyone. Therefore, the municipality aims to secure
mixed income housing through their owned residential building stock, and through financial
support structures. Municipal planners and policy makers designated the Norwegian State House
Bank (hereafter the House Bank) as a primary partner to develop mechanisms to support first
time buyers and to work against spatial segregation along income lines.
Accordingly, I interviewed a local representative of the House Bank. The House Bank is
officially responsible for implementing the national government's housing policy9. Traditionally,
Norwegian housing politics has emphasized ownership over renting as a socially just policy. In
the 1980’s the Norwegian housing market was deregulated and then, according to the
representative, “the 1990s started with an economic downturn and the collapse of the private
banking system. Many customers were beset by financial problems, and the banks suffered large
losses. Again the House Bank was used to counteract the business cycle and financed nearly all
home building” [interviewed 10.11.2020]. Since then, following trends in the national
government, the House Bank has largely been relegated to helping “people with long term
difficulties'' (i bid). In 2014, the government directed the House Bank to end the long standing
program offering low interest loans to first time buyers if they are eligible for loans from private
banks with significantly less favorable terms.
The interview took an unexpected turn from the beginning when I asked the representative about
the recently announced new, national “strategy for social housing politics''. He replied that he
9The institution was established by law after world war two to ensure “adequate and secure housing for all” and
has played a key role in the development of the Norwegian welfare state. (https://www.husbanken.no/om-husbanken/)
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hadn’t been given any information about it yet. His team had been called into a meeting about it
two weeks before but when they got to the meeting, they were not briefed on the new plan.
Instead, they were informed that the House Bank is being restructured. His team is going to be
relocated to the central regional office and local offices will be shut down. The financial arm of
the bank will be “severed from the competence branch” and moved to the national department
[interviewed 10.11.2020]. He said he and his co-workers were “a little shocked, we didn’t see it
coming”. The House Bank representative explained that the current reforms initiated by the
ruling Conservative party in 2015 are an extension of a longer running trend, “originally, the
House Bank was for everyone but over the last 30 years it’s been diluted to a “social housing
bank” meaning it can only help people who are especially disadvantaged, for example people
fresh out of prison, refugees, severely disabled. He went on, “but the real challenge is the middle,
people who are not disadvantaged enough to get help from the House Bank but are still unable to
compete on the housing market. It’s called the ‘missing middle’” [interviewed 10.11.2020].
In 2008 changes to the planning and building law meant private developers could send in their
own plans. In the House Bank representative’s opinion, shared with the spatial planners, this
change has led to low quality housing with high turnover rates and a lack of affordable family
housing. The municipality doesn’t have the legal tools to ensure that housing for everyone gets
built, they can only control prices and quality in the property they own which is far less than it
used to be. The House Bank representative explained that in other European countries there exist
laws and financial tools to counteract market forces and secure affordable housing. In England
for example, a municipality can regulate a percent of affordable housing in a development
project. The representative and his team put together a report to see what kinds of tools exist in
Norway compared to other countries and found that Norwegian cities had less tools than cities in
neighboring countries. The representative shared his personal opinion that ultimately,
“The municipality is dependent on private developers. The city talks a lot about diversity
and social sustainability but if we look at what is actually being built, there isn’t much of
that. Planners - a lot of talented people - but their role has changed. We can say there has
been a shift from municipal planning to the private sector.”
He agreed with the spatial planners that the only way to change the market based system is to
change the law. “As long as we have a right wing government this isn’t going to change. There
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has been very little attention from the political leadership on the House Banks desire to solve the
ensuing problems.” [interviewed 10.11.2020].
5.1.5 Summary of light rail analysis
There has been active public engagement about the light rail featuring debates about the
fundamental values that should guide urban development. According to the current city
government, the light rail is the backbone of the future mobility system and as such, it is the
basis for the municipality’s zoning plan for future developments. The new zoning plan signaled
shifting constellations of power between planners, elected officials and developers with less
power available for lobbyists to obtain concessions. Given regulatory constraints and protections
for private property, the densification agenda aligns with the profit maximizing agenda of private
developers leading to concerns about gentrification.
5.2 Tolls
In the previous section I discussed the light rail which is intimately connected with congestion
tolls in at least two ways. First, a portion of the funds generated from the tolls are used to
partially finance expansion of the light rail. Second, there were highly visible public
demonstrations leading up to the last city council election organized to protest tolls and the light
rail together met with multiple counter protests. In the following section I present social
inclusion considerations emerging from the relationship between congestion tolls, the
commoning of urban mobility and a surge of popular resistance to policies aimed at reducing
personal car use.
5.2.1 Background
In 1986, Bergen was the first city in Norway to introduce an urban investment package partly
financed by tolls. Tolls are charges collected from cars when they pass fixed stations.
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Historically, tolls were placed on the facility, usually a road or bridge, that the funds were used to
finance. Today they are used to address problems such as traffic congestion, air pollution, carbon
emissions and scarce urban space. In Bergen, funds generated from tolls are earmarked for
partially financing light rail expansion, subsidizing operating costs for the regional bus system,
improving walking and cycling infrastructure, sidewalks, and road and bridge maintenance. In
2013, the tariffs at the toll stations doubled. In 2019, 15 new tolling stations were added bringing
the total to 29. Fees double during rush hours at 14 of the stations but not at the 15 stations that
became operational in 2019. For a few years there were exemptions for EVs, now they pay a
sixth of what fossil fuel cars pay. People with documented ‘reduced mobility’ are exempt from
tolls in Bergen.
The political will to use tolls as a tool has traditionally been lacking in most cities (Levinson,
2019). Consequently, there has been a great deal of research on the public acceptability of road
pricing. Several studies have found that familiarity was a factor in public acceptance; once
people saw the positive effects of the policy, acceptance increased (Hysing and Isakson, 2015;
Eliasson and Jonsson, 2011; Steg and Forward, 2010). However, research in Bergen found that
familiarity did not improve acceptance (Tvinnereim et al, 2020). Other studies have concluded
that low trust in policy makers was a barrier and that dedicating a portion of the funds towards
expanding public transportation and subsidizing operating costs would likely improve public
acceptance (Viegas, 2001; Levinson 2010, 2019).
5.2.2 City political platform
The city council platform has a section dedicated to tolls which begins,
“The fight against climate change and pollution goes hand in hand with the fight against
growing inequality. A climate and environment policy that contributes to social
equalization is not only right it is necessary. It must be easier to travel with public
transport, such that more people have the opportunity to opt out of the car” (Bergen
municipality, 2019a).
Tolls are not mentioned until the fourth sentence which acknowledges that “Toll roads are not the
ideal method to finance development of the public transportation system and necessary roads.
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Toll roads in the city are today an important and effective tool to secure better air quality, more
space, less noise, less emissions and less congestion” (i bid). This leads to the question of what
the ideal method to finance development of the public transportation system and necessary roads
is. When I asked a previous city council political advisor, they replied that the wording here
reflects the delicate rhetorical art of coalition building, ideal would be no resistance or no climate
change or scarcity but given reality, tolls are the best option we have [interviewed 24.09.2020].
5.2.3 The Public Roads Administration
The tolls are legislated through the zero growth target’s corresponding Urban Growth
Agreement, a multilateral strategy for preventing growth of traffic into cities reinforced with
contingent national funding for public transport. As remarked on by all of my informants from
municipal planning offices, the city's goal is even more ambitious than zero growth – they aim to
reduce traffic by 30% from 2019 levels by 2023. However, they expressed concern that planned
mega road projects leading into the city may jeopardize efforts to achieve the targets. Several
municipal planners and policy makers expressed frustration with the Public Roads
Administration’s continued commitment to a planning rationality they view as “outdated'' and
“car centric” [interviewed 04.11.2020a, 04.11.2020b, 15.10.2020, 22.10.2020]. As one mobility
planner put it, “The Public Roads Administration signs the (urban growth) agreement but they
don’t practice it”, and “We have been on track, reduced traffic by 10% one year ahead of
schedule - surpassing the target. But the new roads make the targets impossible” [interviewed
28.10.2020].
The mega projects will replace and expand fully functional roads to reduce travel times between
urban regions and increase capacity from two lanes to four to meet projected demand. The first
leg is expected to reduce the travel time between Bergen and Stavanger from around 4 hours to 2
hours by constructing unprecedentedly large bridges and tunnels (Davik, 2020). According to the
Public Roads Administration website, this mega project is expected to be “the great work of our
time” (i bid). The administration also claims, “the expanded E39 will result in such large changes
in time use, distances and predictability that the potential for major changes in society is likely''
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and that the projects will benefit “not only those that use the roads but also the entire country” (i
bid).
A new national transport plan was released in March 2021 and I attended the national Mobility
Conference leading up to it’s release. Some of the frustrations with the Public Roads
Administration expressed by the municipal planners and policy makers I interviewed were
represented at the conference by transportation economics researchers. The researcher’s departed
from the observation that,
“Many of the projects in today's national transport plan are socio-economically
unprofitable. However, it is argued that these large road projects create substantial,
positive ripple effects that aren’t represented in classic cost-benefit analysis. Are
politicians expecting effects that don’t exist?” (Welde et al, 2020)
The researchers presented findings that demonstrated there is no empirical evidence to support
the projections of ‘ripple effects’ described in the net value added analyses. On the contrary, their
findings counter the claims in the project proposals. The researchers stated, “people believe that
building roads leads to economic growth but it’s often not true in already developed places”
(Welde et al, 2020). As a parting thought, the researchers ask the question, “who might benefit
from the projects if not ‘society at large’?”. Besides actors who profit directly from the projects,
the researchers conclude that a relatively small number of commuters will benefit from reduced
travel times.
These presentations were immediately followed by the two principal entities which design and
build mega road projects; a private company reliant on state tenders called ‘New Roads’ and the
Public Roads Administration. The director of New Roads delivered a sales pitch about the
socio-economic benefits of building roads using the very same claims that had just been refuted
by the researchers. The company produces analysis and reports they make with their own,
proprietary “travel time calculator” to show how reduced travel times convert to financial gain in
diverse ways. The director of the Public Roads Administration followed with a presentation
about how building mega roads to connect cities increases productivity and “benefit everyone”
(Hovland, 2021). After the presentations, the moderator asked the director about the preceding
research that contradicted her claims. She answered by arguing that unless we are going to force
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everyone to live in the big cities, social inclusion means building bigger and better roads for
people in rural areas to access job markets.
The goal conflict is glaring. As an exacerbated municipal planner put it, “What they say is that
we build more capacity but then we will reduce it with tolls. Smashes the city targets. Its
obvious, but it’s a paradox” [interviewed 28.10.2020]. All the institutions involved agree that
building increased road capacity into the city will inevitably require price hikes in the congestion
tolls in order to achieve zero growth in traffic. Additionally, the road projects undermine the
logic of densification that is central to the mobility transition and the sustainability agenda more
broadly. An informant pointed out that a broad coalition of interests including environmental
scientists10, labour unions, and the anti-toll protest party opposed prioritizing these projects
[interviewed 04.11.2020]. The new, national transport plan was released in April 2021 and the
four lane mega projects will be financed.
5.2.4 Populist resistance
The increasing number of toll stations and rising prices were met with vocal and occasionally
violent opposition leading up to the establishment of the anti-toll party11. The photo below
depicts a protest against tolls. The signs read, “No to incompetent politicians, No to robbery, No
to corruption, dictators and liars”; “No to tolls, Enough is Enough”; and “R.I.P. Freedom”.
Figure 8. Anti-toll protest in October 2018. Source: Ole Andreas Bø for NRK
11 This article documents harassment and death threats towards politicians and multiple vandalisms of toll stations:
https://www.nrk.no/vestland/drapstrusler_-trafikksabotasje-og-haerverk_-slik-er-den-skitne-siden-av-bompengeop
proret-1.14567366)
10 Massive amount of CO2 will be released from swamps when the roads are built:
https://www.nrk.no/norge/xl/klimabombene-ingen-tenkte-pa-1.15217036
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There were also multiple “drive slowly” demonstrations against road tolls leading up to the last
elections in 2019. One of the protests blocked traffic on a major highway for hours, leading to
significant delays for an ambulance on a call12. The following photo shows a truck in the middle
of downtown Bergen with a banner reading “Politicians are taking from the weakest”.
Figure 9. Anti-toll protest in Bergen leading up to 2019 elections. Source: NRK
Anti-toll party rhetoric refers heavily to social justice with their top priority listed as “to oppose
financing transportation infrastructure with tolls or road pricing. Tolls are an anti-social fee
which unfairly impacts those who have the least” (FNB, 2019). Climate politics also feature
heavily in the platform under the general umbrella of, “concern at an overly high resource use on
climate purposes” and “opposition to climate politics that are intrusive in people’s lives” (i bid).
The party’s platform and media communications often refer to ‘elites’ who are unfairly
punishing ‘regular people’ for driving cars.
The following figure shows the distribution of car ownership, electric and fossil fuel between
different income groups. Grey shows electric vehicle ownership, blue shows fossil fuel car
ownership and green shows how many people don’t own a car. The left column shows household
income brackets with the lowest income on the bottom. The figure shows that 40.7 percent of




households in the lowest income category do not have access to a car. The figure also illustrates a
strong correlation between income and electric vehicle ownership.
Figure 8: Distribution of car ownership by fuel type and household income. Source: Urbanet, 2020
The benefits from owning an electric car including paying far less in tolls and other financial
benefits due to state subsidies and tax breaks are primarily benefiting those who are in the
highest income brackets13. A transport policy advisor responded to the claim that tolls
disproportionately impact those who have the least by first acknowledging there are individual
cases in which people with few resources struggle to make ends meet because tolls add pressure
to already stretched budgets [interviewed 04.11.2020]. However, he emphasized that many
people in the lowest income bracket do not own cars and even among drivers, there is no
empirical foundation for the perception that tolls impact those who already have the least the
hardest. The city council has ordered at least two comprehensive reports on the social impacts of
the tolls (Urbanet, 2020; Norconsult 2020). They both concluded that tolls function according to
their intention, i.e. they impact those who drive a lot rather than those who have the least. The
reports also concludes that replacing the toll system with tax payer financing for the urban
growth agreement, as advocated for by the anti-toll party, would benefit the highest income
bracket of the population the most and hurt people with the lowest income and those who don’t
travel by car the most.
13 see the Norwegian Statistics Bureau:
https://www.ssb.no/transport-og-reiseliv/artikler-og-publikasjoner/kvart-sjette-av-dei-rikaste-hushalda-har-elbil
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In addition, the reports found that men pass tolls stations far more frequently than women. In the
public discourse, including local media, academic conferences14, public meetings and political
debates, sIngle mothers are often used as an example of those who suffer from the toll ring and
other restrictions on automobility in the city. In every case I have encountered so far they were
being spoken for by men15. Several of the planners I spoke with shared this experience and
related stories of men bringing up single mothers as the primary victims of interventions aimed
at reducing private car use [interviewed 08.10.2020; 04.11.2020; 22.10.2020].
The anti-toll party further claims that the toll ring contributes to sociospatial divisions and
specifically that it limits the ability of children to participate in activities. The most recent report
investigating potential social exclusion related to the tolls found no decrease in the levels of
participation in free time activities such as sports and the arts (Norconsult 2020). They noted in
their report that when they interviewed several different arenas for freetime activities including
sports organizations, community centers, dance and music studios, they were told that while
people at that center hadn’t had too much trouble, people at other centers were struggling. The
researchers contacted the other centers the informants were referring to but no center reported
any issues among their own users.
In separate interviews with a political advisor and a transportation researcher, the interviewees
postulated that perceptions of unfairness were exacerbated by the technocratic process to decide
where the new stations should be located [04.11.2020; 15.02.2020]. The location of the toll
stations were decided based on recommendation by the state road department, with no public
participation. This lack of participation may be characterized as a procedural failure which has
largely been blamed on an ‘out of touch urban elite’ in the public discourse. The political advisor
compared the situation to Trondheim where toll resistance has been much lower.
Opposition to the light rail features heavily throughout the anti-toll parties political platform, for
example “A big problem in today's politics is the building of the light rail financed by drivers
through tolls”. The party platform goes on to speculate on possible corruption:
15 For example four men (two on each side) debating whether single mothers need cars:
https://www.bt.no/btmeninger/debatt/i/yRw5vx/unoedvendig-aa-latterliggjoere-bilistene
https://www.bt.no/btmeninger/debatt/i/yR2wL2/hva-vil-fremtiden-mene-om-oss
14 see Bjørn Flø’s presentation at Klimaomstillings konferansen, 2020
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“The toll ring has become a major source of income. The ‘goods’ are concentrated
around the light rail and the mantra is that all problems will be solved if we build the light
rail. The enormous income from tolls and development around the light rail has created
the possibility for a large conspiracy between developers of the light rail, property
developers and the municipalities building & planning bureaucrats.”
The platform goes on to say that there is a lack of transparency about how toll funds are used and
repeats suspicions about possible economic collusion between municipal planners and private
developers.
5.2.5 Summary of tolls analysis
Public acceptance of tolls in Bergen has defied results in other cities such as London where
familiarity with the policy together with dedicating a substantial portion of the funds generated
towards public transportation were factors that increased public acceptance. The latter point has
been especially contentious, with the funds from tolls that partially finance the light rail
reinforcing populist rhetoric of ‘regular people’ against ‘urban elites’. Planned mega road
projects leading into the city are expected to require even further increases in toll prices if the
city is to meet its targets for private vehicles reductions. This is identified by municipal planners,
policy makers and the anti-toll movement as a major goal conflict between the national Public
Roads Administration and the urban dynamics of social inclusion and commoning mobility.
5.3 Car free zones
While the city can not prevent the national road department from building four lane roads into
the city center or demand dedicated bus lanes, they do control spatial allocations related to
driving and parking (Bergen municipality, 2019b). The most recent zoning plan marked a change
from designating the minimum required parking spaces for new developments to now setting
maximum limits to the number of parking spaces together with a minimum requirement for cycle
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parking spaces (i bid). This regulatory change was described in an interview with an architect
and economist working with property development as “the most influential transport intervention
of the new spatial planning directive” [interviewed 27.10.2020]. The municipality also has the
authority to remove existing parking spots on public property and repurpose the space for other
uses such as playgrounds as well as establish car free zones (CFZs). A successful CFZ pilot was
first rolled out in the city center and further projects are now under way, developing more car
free zones in the city center, as well as in the outer suburbs. With an 85 million kroners budgeted
for the roll out and expansion of car free zones in the next three years, the political coalition
government in Bergen is sending a clear signal that car free zones are an important element in the
envisioned low carbon mobility system (Bergen municipality, 2020).
5.3.1 Background
The introduction of CFZs, which are usually more like zones with substantially less cars, is
linked in policy documents to emission reduction targets, transport mode shifts and the intention
of creating inclusive urban spaces (Bergen municipality, 2019a). CFZs usually allow for
emergency and handicap vehicles, waste collection and delivery vehicles. A popular assumption
regarding the role of public transport in transitions is that expanding public transport to increase
accessibility encourages mode switches away from automobility, thereby reducing energy
consumption (Holden, 2007: 181). However, comprehensive empirical investigations have
demonstrated that expanding public transportation provision leads to only modest reductions in
per capita energy consumption unless it is combined with other actions to restrict private car use
such as tolls, removing parking spaces, and car free zones (i bid). Likewise, studies have shown
that the likelihood of car trips being replaced with soft mobility is linked to the built environment
which can be designed to encourage or discourage the substitution (Gallo and Marinelli, 2020;
Cevero and Radish, 1996; Arroyo et al, 2018; Fistola et al, 2018).
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5.3.2 CFZs Downtown
I separately interviewed two planners who were involved in the establishment of the first
neighborhood CFZ located in Møhlenpris. One of the informants is a senior mobility planner
who has a few decades of experience and the other was in her first year when she worked on the
pilot CFZ at Møhlenpris. Møhlenpris was built before the advent of ubiquitous automobility. The
area is compact and densely populated with excellent connection to the rest of the city through
public transportation, with a major bus hub on one end and the light rail on the other in addition
to walking and cycling infrastructure. As one of the planners put it, “we got a lot for free”
[interviewed 08.10.2020]. I understood this comment in reference to both the physical properties
and socio-cultural composition of the area as well as the ability to take action when the street
was being dug up for infrastructure upgrades. “(Møhlenpris) was a bit special because it took a
long time for the political position to become operational” but then “the whole area was being
dug up due to water, sewerage upgrades. we could use the opportunity but we didn’t have time
for long planning processes so we needed to do something that could be done without asking too
much permission” [interviewed 28.10.2020].
The planners emphasized that during the planning and roll out of the project, they made special
efforts to make sure that all the groups could be heard and they were able to get feedback from
people who don’t normally speak up.
“Initially it was the most resourceful people leading the discussion- what they ended up
doing in MPris was in the part of the area that was mostly inhabited by resourceful
people, they got something they wanted. It was beneficial to the whole area but those
closer to the bridge were more in need of an upgrade but we couldn’t manage to really do
much about that in the first stage” [interviewed 28.10.2020]
The area “closer to the bridge” is earmarked for improvements based on the ‘Living and health
conditions survey’. The senior planner explained that it’s uncertain if they will be able to expand
the project into that area or if they need to move on to somewhere else in the city that needs help
more. The living conditions and health survey is a tool for understanding sociospatial patterns
across the city. It combines data from diverse databanks and creates a comprehensive report on
social indicators related to health, income, immigration, family composition and a diverse set of
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other indicators. This data is integrated with the geographic information system planners use to
identify the needs of different areas and direct investments towards those with the lowest scores.
This is one of the primary tools planners use to incorporate social justice concerns into their
work systematically. As the senior planner put it, “People are very aware of these things, the data
from that is included in the digital map system the city uses to plan initially” [interviewed
28.10.2020].
In Møhlenpris, there were organized groups requesting the CFZ and multiple interest groups to
consult with on potential issues and concerns related to social inclusivity and accessibility.
These included: Møhlenpris action group, Møhlenpris street forum (invited the planners to their
meetings), Somalian Women’s Association and the Retirees Group. When I asked about the risk
of the most engaged or loudest voices getting too much attention, the junior planner responded
that participants were often telling the planners about other people who needed to be considered
and talked to. They played an active role in identifying stakeholders the planners might
otherwise have missed.
Without being prompted by me, the junior planner also relayed an observation that attracted my
attention throughout the research. During her work on public participation for car free
Møhlenpris she noticed that more than once men over the age of 50 would state that removing
the cars was unfair to families with small children. She specifically related a time at a public
meeting, there was a man she estimated over the age of 60 who stood up and said that the car
free plan ignored the needs of young families. Then, a young father who lives in the
neighborhood stood up and said that was an inaccurate claim about their family’s needs and they
preferred a car free street. When I subsequently interviewed the senior planner, I asked about this
observation and he confirmed that it is a noticeable phenomenon and it pops up in the media
fairly often as well. Planners working on other car free zone projects confirmed this trend and
expressed frustration that single mothers are used as a rhetorical strategy to defend automobility.
The junior planner stressed that it is important to “work a little extra” and “you need an extra pair
of eyes” to make sure your work results in equitable and inclusive solutions. She added that,
“There is no official handbook on how to make socially just decisions” and there is no
replacement for talking to people [interviewed 08.10.2020]. The senior planner explained his
view on participation, “it seems like a hassle, public hearings, involving stakeholders, but it’s
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important to preserve democratic principles. Ensures nobody can do anything that is
unaccountable, not considering groups that need to be considered” [interviewed 28.10.2020]. All
of the municipal planners I interviewed emphasized the value of accountability and listening as
part of the learning process about how the city works and how changes impact people with the
aim of being more systematic and strategic with interventions.
5.3.3 Suburban CFZs
CFZs in the suburbs will face challenges particular to the planning legacies embedded in the
built environment i.e. lower densities with car dependent mobility infrastructure and social
practices. One planner reflected that, “space is organized differently, you have segregated spaces
in the suburbs” [interviewed 28.10.2020]. In addition, planners expect the cultural attitudes
towards CFZs and sustainability transitions in general to be different than areas in the center. The
electoral map of the city (see section 4.1) indicates that if CFZs are linked with the tolls in the
public discourse as part of the sustainable mobility agenda they could face heightened
opposition.
In section 3.3.3 I described the workshop I conducted with researchers and municipal planners
working on CFZs. It began with two presentations from researchers in which they emphasized
the importance of telling residents that car free zones are not new and are being established in
cities all over Europe and beyond as a tool for decreasing anxiety and increasing public
acceptance. This resonated with several of the planners who remarked that they always point out
to people that car free zones are not new. Thus rooting interventions in historical practice is
viewed by these planners as an important tool for public acceptance.
These practices of enrollment are possibly more important in light of the lack of public
participation in selecting areas for the new zones. When the planning department received the
mandate from the city council to establish car free zones in every suburb, a planner then began
working with a specialist in geographic information systems to identify suitable locations. At the
co-production workshop, the planners agreed that it was best if they selected the locations before
any participatory processes were initiated. The planners justified this position due to time and
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budget constraints but also because they have the competence to consider all the necessary
factors.
One of the team leaders in the co-production workshop shared that she uses a heuristic for
socially just planning in which she imagines a “single mom from Africa with five children and
no car”. I was reminded of a comment from my interview with the spatial planners where they
agreed that, “What’s good for a single mom is also good for a man in a tie” [interviewed
22.10.2020]. I also asked if the distribution of ownership versus renters was a factor in deciding
where to put the zones. They replied that they weren’t using data on that aspect in their planning.
I went on to ask whether they were concerned that improvements to an area might cause property
prices to rise, potentially pushing out poorer residents but they answered this did not seem like a
very realistic scenario.
The project description for car free zones in the suburbs states that the purpose is to “make space
for people at the expense of private cars” (Bergen municipality, 2020), representing the city
government's interpretation of people centric urban design. The suburban car free zone planners
at the co-production workshop agreed that they did not expect the zones to contribute directly to
meeting the zero growth target in any significant way because it was likely that people would not
stop using their cars, they would simply park a little further away. Another mobility planner,
interviewed separately, works with CFZs in addition to several other initiatives and explained,
“We need to do something that can change some transport habits in the short time with
the infrastructure that’s there. There are a lot of long term plans to change everything
when the light rail arrives but we are also working on pilots projects now. In the short
term, how much can we influence?” [interviewed 28.10.2020].
When I asked the representative whose party spearheaded the campaign for suburban CFZs what
they hoped to achieve, she answered, “we want to fill the streets with joy” and “make it better for
people there” [interviewed 15.10.2020]. She went on to explain that her party wants to give
something good to the suburbs and counter the perception that they only care about the city
center where the overwhelming majority of their constituents live. Perhaps the most important
insight from the interview came when the representative added that she hoped the car free zones
would “make areas so nice that people wouldn’t feel the need to travel further to the mountains
or take plane trips to the south for vacation” [interviewed 15.10.2020]. While not articulated in
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any formal documents, this sentiment clarifies what the greens aspires to achieve with these
interventions, i.e. the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through reductions in leisure travel
by car and plane.
The above interpretation of people centric urban design is contested. The representative for the
anti-toll party called the initiative to create CFZs in every suburb “political abuse”. He went on
to say that “people perceive this as completely meaningless and provocative, and without factual
justification. This is why people call them (The Green Party) car haters.” He went on to say that
the job of politicians is to make life better and simpler for people.
“Our experience is that the people who govern today are more concerned with political
fads than with giving people a better life. Many of us think the city council today only
serves the city center. Those who live in the center get everything, culture, public
services, city bicycles etc and most of it is almost free. Meanwhile, people in the suburbs
have worse services and they have to pay for everything.” [interviewed 27.10.2020]
It was clear in the interview that creating car free zones in the suburbs was not viewed by this
representative as a public service meant to improve the lives of suburban dwellers and include
them in the benefits of low carbon spatial logics.
5.3.4 Summary of car free zone analysis
For some people, including the planners and policy designers working with them, CFZs
represent a vision of people centric urban design. These actors view CFZs as having the potential
to make space for low carbon logics by supporting soft mobility and performing a good life
without cars. For others, CFZs, especially in the suburbs, represent empty symbolism and
punitive actions against ‘regular’ people who drive cars. The plan to establish CFZs in every
suburb is an experiment without very many examples to learn from. Planners attributed the
success of the CFZ pilot project in the city center to several factors that will not be the case for
suburban CFZ planners. Chief among these were engaging public involvement from the first
stages of planning and a pre-car planning legacy.
70
5.4 Analysis summary
In the table below I summarize the policy characteristics and implications for social inclusion for
each intervention before revisiting inclusion at a higher level of abstraction using the three
pronged conceptual framework developed in section 2.
Table 4: Policy characteristics and inclusion impacts of each intervention
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To address the question of how the three interventions aimed at reducing private car use impact
social inclusion, I conceptualized social inclusion as a dynamic process related to urban
commoning. Commoning refers to the conditions that support sharing resources and resist
enclosure. The relationship between the three interventions and social inclusion allows for a
threefold discussion of how social inclusion within mobility transitions is understood and
practiced: (i) how access and exclusion are thought about, (ii) how space, time and social change
are imagined, and (iii) the politics of social inclusion. In the rest of this section, I use the three
core axes of my conceptual framework (see figure 1) to revisit aspects of the cases in terms of
their implications for social inclusion and commoning urban mobility.
6.1 Access and exclusion
The three cases illustrate the complex nature of access and social inclusion. As discussed in
section 2.3, the main approach to access that explicitly deals with social inclusion is transport
related social exclusion (Keynon et al, 2003). This approach to access focuses on how lack of
adequate access to mobility impacts disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and
communities. I juxtaposed this approach with the concepts of hypermobility (Urry, 2000) and
self-exclusion (Lucas, 2012) and combined them to develop the concept of dynamic inclusion.
The following discussion draws out two elements of access that illuminate the contours of
dynamic social inclusion, (i) representations and categories of vulnerability, and (ii) trade-offs of
access related to light-rail expansion in the context of market driven development.
6.1.1 Representations of vulnerability
The case study of Bergen offers an opportunity to explore the limits of the transport related
social exclusion approach. Once a city has managed to ensure basic levels of access with
particular attention to disadvantaged populations, there is still potential to make urban mobility
73
systems more socially inclusive. In an interview with a representative of the public transportation
company (Skyss), the informant cited a 2018 report that showed 65% of people over 18 have
‘excellent’ access to public transportation, which means a bus or light rail stop within 500 meters
of their residence that is serviced at least 4 times an hour. Another 15% has ‘good’ access
[interviewed 14.03.2021]. According to the representative , access has improved in the three
years since the report and the remaining (less than) 20% lack good service primarily because
they are geographically dispersed, not necessarily because they live in poor or racially segregated
neighborhoods which is a central focus in ‘transport related social exclusion’ studies (Lucas,
2012). As the mobility planner in Bergen explained, municipal and regional actors use the
comprehensive ‘living standards and health’ survey to identify areas where residents are
disadvantaged in diverse ways and direct investments towards them. The areas with the lowest
scores in the survey do not correlate closely with lack of access to public transportation. This
provides a backdrop to explore the notion of dynamic social inclusion beyond efforts to provide
basic levels of access to the most disadvantaged populations.
As I noted in the discussion of urban commoning scholarship (section 2.2.2), public
transportation, when subsidized and provided as a public good, is not a subtractable resource. As
long as increased funds from ticket fares are cycled back into improving the service, the more
people use it the better it gets. This is a prime example of how dynamic social inclusion in the
context of commoning urban mobility expands the notion of inclusion advanced through liberal
distributive justice. In addition to ensuring basic levels of access for the people with the least
resources, dynamic inclusion also concentrates on the middle and upper classes to look for
common solutions that build solidarity through scaling up and normalizing non-car mobility.
Public transportation in Bergen is also subsidized partially through funds from tolls. Thus, access
to the city by car is conditional on contributing to the expansion and subsidized operating costs
of public transportation. This partially addresses the problem of self-enforced exclusion
described by Lucas (2012) and Barry (2002) whereby people who have access to public
transportation choose to drive anyway. Tolls ensure that even in the act of choosing to opt-out of
using the common system, drivers still contribute to the commoning project. This policy is more
than redistribution within a zero-sum game because regardless of whether they use public
transportation or not, drivers still benefit indirectly from better air quality and reduced
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congestion. I interpret this as an example of dynamic inclusion through countering the regime of
scarcity (Hoeschele, 2010) imposed by automobility with the affirmation of abundance within
planetary boundaries.
My interpretation is contested by the anti-toll party which claims that they, the ‘regular people’
bear the costs while ‘elites’ reap the benefits. The party habitually uses single mothers as an
example of vulnerable people who are unfairly impacted by tolls leading to social exclusion.
Throughout my research, single mothers were represented in multiple ways, but their voices are
rarely heard directly. The underlying assumption in the claims made by the anti-toll party is that
access for single mothers is dependent on automobility and that the costs associated with driving
are not outweighed by the benefits of the policies. Conversely, some of the car free zone planners
imagine “an African, single mom with several children and no car” to aid in designing inclusive
spaces.
Overall, there seems to be agreement across disparate actors that single mothers are vulnerable.
Indeed, in the public discourse it seems that they represent the very essence of vulnerability. This
makes them powerful rhetorical devices within conversations about social inclusion and access.
However, as noted by Cass, Shove and Urry (2005) in their critique of transport related social
exclusion in practice, local authorities routinely conflate predefined demographic categories such
as single parent homes with lack of access and related social exclusion. In this case, reference to
single mothers as a blanket category conceals the differences between actual single mothers and
their situated relationship to access. First, there is no reason to assume all single mothers are poor
or burdened by the financial costs of driving, including paying tolls. Second, there is no reason to
assume a single mother without a car is experiencing social exclusion from lack of access to
mobility services. It is not objective or obvious what adequate access and participation in society
means for different groups or individuals (i bid). As illustrated by the anecdote from the planner
about a father who said he welcomed a planned car free zone, there is also support for restricting
automobility among parents. This issue highlights the significance of inclusive participatory
processes that can allow people to speak for themselves about their needs rather than be reduced
to representations and categories of vulnerability. The planners who worked with participatory
processes for the successful CFZ pilot downtown agreed, there is no replacement for talking to
people.
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6.1.2 Accessing benefits from the light rail
Ribot and Peluso's (2003) definition of access beyond rights-based approaches allows for a
nuanced discussion of access and the light rail. While I interpret shifts in public investment from
automobility to public transportation as broadly progressive and promoting dynamic social
inclusion, public transportation infrastructures are not unqualified goods set to benefit everyone
equally. Through this example I want to celebrate the successes and transformations underway
while heeding Nightingale’s (2019) call to keep sight of the exclusions and enclosures that result
from processes of commoning as it unfolds within the wider context of growing inequality and
neoliberalisation.
On the positive side, the light rail’s universal design is a material manifestation of inclusivity. It
moves beyond a binary of able/ disabled bodies towards recognizing that people are differently
abled throughout their lives. This speaks to a notion of inclusion that recognizes that needs
change over time and preferences are not fixed. It also speaks to an expanded notion of access,
by highlighting the differences between the right to access something, the geographic ability to
access something and the physical ability to access it for differently abled bodies. In addition, the
frequent stops provide access to more people, reflecting the concept of transportation
infrastructure as urban development (Bannister, 2008; Holden et al, 2020).
The biggest pitfall of the light rail is not within the technology itself but in its relationship to the
densification agenda and the commodification of urban space (Enright, 2019). This demonstrates
the assertion throughout mobility scholarship that a narrow view of access within the
transportation policy arena obscures the barriers that exist due to processes in other sectors and
scales. In this case the relevant other sectors and scales are the market driven property
development sector and the national laws that support it together with the neoliberalisation of the
welfare state that is restructuring the historically strong social housing politics overseen by the
state house bank. Commoning scholars are particularly concerned with resisting elite capture of
common resources. Access to the light rail should not be relegated to people with the most
resources or generate new forms of marginalized ‘others’ (Kurtz, 2001; Nightingale, 2019).
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Municipal actors are cognizant of this challenge but have limited tools to address it. This plays
out in two ways. First, many current residents of areas undergoing large scale change due to the
light rail are not all pleased. However, they have no recourse because the project is seen by the
current city council as too important and too fragile to slow down. The relative permanence of
the light rail compared to bus routes, and the administrative control the municipality has over the
former but not the latter, means that new developments are restricted to limited strategic
corridors. These residents feel marginalized by the agenda for densification linked with the
urgency to mitigate climate change. The rhetoric used to defend densification is such that context
specific claims can be refuted as resistance to ‘the big picture’ of climate change mitigation
measures.
Second, the light rail mobilizes space for capitalist accumulation through creating high value
corridors for property development and supporting the establishment of service and consumer
hubs. The exchange value of the property along the light rail is inflated due to the strict new
spatial plan prohibiting development elsewhere. This is a form of constructed scarcity. There are
concerns that this will push out or exclude not only poorer residents but the middle class as well.
For residents who can afford to buy housing along the light rail, the quality of homes in densified
areas is decreasing. When the production of space is dominated by market forces, transportation
infrastructure becomes a tool for the creation of urban rent (Enright 2016). The mobility
infrastructure and service itself is a public good, theoretically open to everyone but using it as a
primary travel mode from places of dwelling is largely dependent on one's ability to secure
housing in a competitive private market.
Developers respond to this scarcity with demands for deregulating the strict municipal zoning
plan. For the spatial planners and the city council this is an unacceptable solution because of the
links between mitigating climate change, densification and meeting the zero growth target
through shifting from a car centric mobility system to one that prioritizes public transportation
and soft mobility. Another potential solution was mentioned by the spatial planners which is to
transfer the responsibility for providing bus services from the regional to the municipal level.
However, the planners acknowledged both political and practical challenges with this solution,
including the potential for services throughout the rest of the region to decline without the funds
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from urban fares and congestion tolls. This could have negative social inclusion impacts on
people in the wider region.
Given current administrative and judicial arrangements, a primary pathway for the municipality
to counteract gentrification is through partnering with the state House Bank. However, the
institution is about to be restructured and severed from its financial branch. After decades of
market liberalization, the House Bank has already been relegated to serving the most
disadvantaged people rather than playing a key role in housing politics in general as they
originally did. A comment from the House Bank representative points to the problem with this
approach, “it’s not just defunding, it’s the stigma around the house bank as something for needy
people, not regular people - undermines the whole project” [interviewed 10.11.2020]. This
assessment aligns with my critique of liberal policies of redress in practice. When inclusion is
only facilitated by the state for the most disadvantaged people, there are missed opportunities to
make structural changes that would make social transformations more inclusive and equitable
[Enright, 2019]. The normative argument throughout this thesis is that commoning both
processes and resource use is more inclusive than safety net solutions for ‘the least well off’.
While several of my informants from the public and private sector described the recent spatial
plan as a shift in power from private developers and their lobbyists towards technocratic planners
and the city council, this is a short-term perspective. In a longer time frame, market actors have
been gaining power for decades and maintain the upper hand (Aarsæther, 2018). As the state
House Bank representative pointed out, Norwegian cities have less ability to regulate affordable
housing and put restrictions on private property developers than any of our Scandinavian
neighbors or several other European countries including the UK. Under these conditions, there is
a strong alignment of interests between the sustainability agenda for densification and capitalist
interests to maximize profits by building many small units of low quality with high prices.
However, following from Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) notion of access that includes the ability to
benefit from something, access to benefits flowing from the light rail is not restricted by owning
property near it. The light rail stops at many mobility hubs connecting to park and rides, buses,
bike sharing, and car sharing nodes. It is used frequently by people who don’t live near it as part
of multi-modal journeys around the city. There are also more indirect benefits such as reducing
congestion for car dependent and bus dependent people, thus freeing up the urban space
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previously required for parking and the equivalent of 90 buses during rush hour. The space freed
up can be used for other shared purposes like playgrounds and parks or to provide more housing
which can be regulated for affordable housing if it is owned by the municipality. To summarize,
the light rail impacts social inclusion and access in diverse ways, shaped by forces in other
sectors and at other scales.
6.1.3 Concluding reflections on access
I have argued that transport related social exclusion, based on liberal policies of redress, is
insufficient for addressing the escalating dynamics of hypermobility. Representations of
vulnerability, even when with the best of intentions, are not a substitute for participation because
people's needs are context specific and relational. At worst, relying on assumptions related to
predefined categories of people can turn them into rhetorical devices for agendas that are counter
to their actual interests.
Read through a theory of access, the analysis of the light rail demonstrates that the ability to
benefit from mobility infrastructures is not limited to directly accessing them. On the other hand,
the ability to access the light rail directly is more limited than the right to access it. My findings
indicate that cross sectoral analysis is an important arena for thinking about access. Accordingly,
mobility cannot be treated as an isolated policy arena but rather entangled with broader processes
of urban development and social transformation. Thus, bringing mobility planning and policy
making into dialogue with literature on urban commoning may generate new forms of thinking
about and practicing social inclusion during low carbon transitions. Viewing mobility simply in
terms of access distribution and designing policies to expand public transportation doesn’t
account for the way mobility infrastructures are linked with, as I demonstrated in the previous
section, processes of gentrification, and in the upcoming sections: imaginaries of space, time and
social change followed by processes of legitimation.
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6.2 Imagining space, time and social change
My analysis of the three interventions illustrates multiple ways that space, time and social
change are imagined in relation to mobility. In this section I elaborate on how these imaginaries
impact the way social inclusion is operationalized to justify different mobility infrastructures as
well as some of the social inclusion consequences. I center the discussion around two of the
interventions studied: tolls and car free zones.
6.2.1 Bigger, faster, better: The great work of our time
The prime directive for transportation infrastructure to overcome space and reduce travel times
(Rodrigue, 2020) has traditionally been linked with economic growth and widespread societal
benefits. In the context of shifting norms, practices and provision towards commoning the urban
mobility system, the vision of social change as the product of mega road projects between cities
is challenged. The Public Roads Administration claims that increased road capacity into the city
is necessary to provide more people the option to live spread out and still have access to the
urban labor markets through reduced travel times. Social inclusion is thus translated into building
bigger and better roads with higher speed limits. The claim that the projects will also benefit
society as a whole rests on the assumption that reduced travel times between cities will
necessarily stimulate economic growth and thereby benefit everyone.
While empirical evidence refutes the claims about widespread societal benefits, the costs are
substantial. Taxpayer money finances 40% of the projects meaning people in the lowest income
bracket and people who don’t drive still pay for the mega road projects. In addition, low income,
car dependent commuters in the areas adjacent to Bergen’s center will pay the cost of the toll
hikes. Essentially, they will be subsidizing reduced travel times for people who are able to
capitalize on the reduced travel times between cities. The claim that these projects benefit society
as a whole obscures the mechanisms by which distribution is heavily slanted towards a relatively
small number of people with enough resources and flexibility to benefit. Therefore, the road
projects satisfy neither the Rawlsian principles of liberal justice nor the notion of dynamic social
inclusion grounded in commoning. The latter prioritizes social coordination around shared
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resources over individual choice enabled for some by regimes of automobility, read through
Hoeschelle (2010) and Nikolaeva et al (2019) as regimes of scarcity.
Reflecting upon the continued commitment to mega projects despite research undermining the
claims used to justify them, I draw on Bourdieu's (1998) assertion that neoliberalism is a ‘strong’
discourse and Flyvbjerg’s (1998: 321) observation that “The absence of rational arguments and
factual documentation in support of certain actions may be more important indicators of power
than arguments and documentation produced.” The evidence points to an agenda to build roads
that lacks institutionalized poste-ante evaluations and ignores independent research that
contradicts the claims justifying the agenda. One of these claims is that “large changes in time
use, distances and predictability mean the potential for major changes in society is likely”(Davik,
2020). Thus, the mega road projects may be seen as manifestations of a notion of social change
as the product of technocratic governance, technological innovations and economic growth.
In conclusion, to understand the impact of congestion tolls on social inclusion, it is necessary to
account for processes at other scales and the imaginaries of space, time and social change that
inform them. The informants I interviewed expect that the mega road projects will require the
city of Bergen to continue increasing toll charges to meet the zero growth target and thereby
place more hardship on local commuters, possibly leading to transport related social exclusion.
The Public Roads Administration claims that the necessary increases in tolls are worth the
increased ability of people to choose where to live and work, reflecting the values of individual
choice and hyper mobility. In the next section I will contrast the imaginary discussed above with
the low carbon logics of commoning mobility through car free zones.
6.2.2. Making space for low carbon logics with car free zones
In the previous section I described the conceptions of space, time and social change implicated in
the mega road projects. Implied by these conceptions is the value of individual choice over
collective coordination. This analysis can be extended to private cars which not only enclose
public space (Nikolaeva et al, 2019) but also segregate and enclose urban subjects (Nightingale,
2019; Sheller and Urry, 2006). Mobilities scholars argue that cars are a kind of bubble people
cocoon themselves in, not only spatially but temporally (Cresswell, 2010; Lucas, 2012; Barry,
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2002, Sheller and Urry, 2006). Automobility means not having to coordinate with collective time
tables or systems of provision. People have demonstrated that they are willing to pay for this
arrangement and based on predict and provide models, governments have provided more and
more infrastructure for it. The result is the production of distances which only cars can shrink
(Illich, 1974). If we think of infrastructures as declarations of society's values and therefore
inherently political (Rutherford, 2020), then when it comes to car centric planning, we have
collectively subsidized a system that devalues social coordination, spaces of encounter and the
urban commons. This brings to mind how Bourdieu (1998: 1) described neoliberalism: “a
programme for destroying collective structures which may impede pure market logic”.
CFZs represent an alternative approach to space, time and social change. Rather than overcome
space, CFZs aim to produce it in the tradition of Lefebvre ( c.f. 1996). The production of space
correlates to ‘the right to the city’ (Harvey, 2003), meaning the right to change ourselves by
changing the spatial arrangements that structure our lives. This approach diverges from the
notion of social change implicit in predict and provide. If planners only predict based on
observed behaviours then they cannot provide for behaviours that are not yet possible or
attractive. My interview with the representative for the party who designed the suburban CFZ
policy revealed that they are intended to make space for social change grounded in low carbon
logics by designing built environments that support performances of a good life without cars.
Critics of the CFZs have argued that they are merely symbolic interventions but in light of
scholarship on transitions and social change, (Burch et al, 2014; Bannister, 2008) being symbolic
and performative is not inherently bad or useless. According to Amundsen et al. (2018) this is
one of the primary ways cities can contribute to mitigating climate change. While planners do
not expect the creation of CFZs in the suburbs to contribute substantially to the zero growth
target directly, they may be understood as experiments in manipulating space to plant seeds of
social transformation (Burch et al, 2014).
The degree to which CFZs impact social inclusion through a commoning lens reveals a weakness
in the municipality's current approach. While the Møhlenpris CFZ is a good example of
commoning because the local residents were engaged from the start, with some of them initiating
the process to begin with, the suburban CFZs are more top down. Inclusion in the planning
process will begin after the locations are chosen by professional planners. This case illustrates
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the tensions between participation and other goals that municipal planners must navigate. On the
one hand, the planners recognize that a significant element of success in the city center pilot
project was deep public engagement and that the suburban CFZs risks backlash from local
residents given structural and cultural differences between the city center and the suburbs. The
planners will engage the public once they have selected the area, but the decisions delegated to
the public will be minor and the primary purpose will be enrollment (Legacy, 2017;Hanssen et
al, 2015). The legitimacy of the planners in this case rests on their role as experts in achieving
politically determined goals in the most efficient manner, i.e. instrumental rationality.
It remains to be seen how this approach plays out in Bergen but the literature on communicative
planning, as well as the interpretations of populist ruptures discussed in section 2.5.1, argue that
denying opportunities for public involvement erodes the legitimacy of planning expertise and
undermines the possibilities for goal achievement in the long run. This approach holds that
citizen participation, ongoing dialogue, time consuming persuasion and even conflict are
valuable elements of planning which lead to better results. As the senior mobility planner in
Bergen described participatory processes, “it seems like a hassle, public hearings, involving
stakeholders, but it’s important to preserve democratic principles” [interviewed 27.10.2020].
The dynamic between social and spatial arrangements is complex and nonlinear. To address this
complexity, mobility transition planners in Bergen view their work as experimental and they
learn by doing pilot projects. These pilot projects provide opportunities for actors upon whom
society depends to make knowledge based decisions to produce the knowledge they need about
the relationship between urban space, mobility and social change related to decarbonization.
Thus, experiments such as suburban car free zones are critical junctures through which new
sociospatial configurations may take place (Bulkeley et al, 2013). I contend that experimenting
with these configurations is a crucial method of commoning through creating spaces of
encounter that support new social relations and sharing resources.
CFZs can potentially contribute to low carbon logics in at least two more ways, reducing leisure
travel by air and car and leveling the playing field for modal choices. The possibility of reducing
leisure travel through people centric built environments is not articulated in formal documents
related to car free zones in Bergen but was expressed in the interview with the city council
representative whose party spearheaded the campaign. Planners are skeptical towards the
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potential for CFZs to reduce leisure travel and do not currently collect any data that could be
used to measure whether this is the case. However, my findings reveal that some of the policy
designers hope this to be the case.
The notion of leveling the playing field refers to how reallocating space away from cars reduces
the attractiveness of automobility and improves the conditions for soft mobility and public
transportation. Thus, CFZs and parking restrictions contribute to undermining the ‘systems of
provision’ that reinforce car dependence (Mattoili et al, 2020). For people who own cars but can
also access public transportation, an important element in choosing to drive is the convenience of
arriving directly at a destination. This convenience may override the penalty of paying tolls but if
parking is no longer ubiquitously available at all destinations, the convenience is undermined. In
addition, car free zones present obstacles to direct routes for driving through the city such that
travel times become longer and more frustrating. Accordingly, the inconveniences associated
with using public transportation are relatively diminished.
While this effect was never articulated as a goal in policy documents or interviews, the sense I
got from the focus groups and moving around in the field myself, is that this mechanism plays an
important role in travel mode choice and also improves perceptions of fairness for those who are
public transportation dependent. People with a lot of resources are able to buy electric cars and
never worry about paying tolls, but a lack of space to park is harder to buy your way out of. By
reducing the benefits of choosing to opt out of using public transportation and soft mobility, this
policy approach contributes to diversifying the transport mode profile. This not only improves
inclusion for current non-drivers but ideally generates more non-drivers. The more non-drivers
there are, the greater the demand for improved soft mobility and public transportation services,
creating a positive feedback loop that resonates with dynamic social inclusion (Mattoili et al,
2020).
There is a complication which arises from the same conditions described in the discussion of the
light rail in the first section, namely the market logic that drives housing allocations. If the car
free zones create such attractive built environments that they increase property prices, they may
also drive gentrification. My conversations with the planners responsible for CFZs revealed that
they are not using any data about whether the properties in areas they are considering are owned
or rented. This makes them blind to this dimension of who will benefit financially if the zones
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increase property values. The planners do not expect the zones to have a significant enough
impact to press out lower income inhabitants but this is also not something they intend to gather
data on as the project progresses so their assumptions will not be tested.
6.2.3 Concluding reflections on imaginaries of space and time
This section has looked at two alternative imaginaries of mobility futures and their social
inclusion implications. The table below summarizes the relationship between the two mobility
infrastructures and conceptions of space, time, social change and inclusion.
Table 5: Imaginaries of space, time, social change and inclusion in road projects and CFZs
Concept Mega road projects Car free zones
space overcome space produce space
time reduce travel times for
some people
level the playing field
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I have claimed that in order for mobility transitions to be inclusive, there needs to be an explicit
and ongoing negotiation of values. I would like to clarify that I do not reject the idea that time is
valuable and thus reduced travel times can be valuable. Rather, the value of reduced travel times,
especially when linked with enabling people to live more spread out, should be weighed against
other societal values such as inclusion of vulnerable people and an overall reduction in resource
use and carbon emissions. I have illustrated how the anticipated toll hikes caused by the mega
road projects will negatively impact low income local commuters, potentially leading to
transport related social exclusion. This trade-off is only made visible by disaggregating the
benefits and burdens of the road projects.
While municipal mobility planners emphasize knowledge based decision making and the active
production of knowledge that is lacking, the presentations from the mobility conference illustrate
that the agenda to build mega road projects leans more on the exercise of power through decision
based knowledge production as described by Flyvbjerg (1998). Rather than heralding “the great
work of our time” as the Public Roads Administration proclaims, I interpret the mega road
projects as barriers to a decisive transition towards low carbon logics, the great challenge of our
time. The picture that emerges is of fragmented and parallel mobility regimes which undermine
social inclusion goals. In contrast, CFZs are embedded in a vision of a decarbonized Bergen in
which public space and collective transportation are prioritized over private enclosure
instantiated by the car (Nikolaeva, 2019). I consider this an instance of commoning mobility in
which shared forms of resource use are prioritized over private ones. However, participation in
earlier stages of the planning process, for example where the zones should be located, would be
an even deeper engagement with commoning mobility (Nikoleava et al, 2019, Nightingale,
2019).
6.3. The politics of social inclusion
The following discussion departs from the assertion that making large scale interventions in
mobility systems has implications for the urban politics of sustainability transformations. Politics
here is taken to mean not only “the activities of cooperation and conflict that emerge as humans
make decisions about the creation and distribution of resources'' (Leftwich 1983: 11, as cited by
86
Avelino et al. 2016: 557) but also the formation of identity through relationships, processes of
legitimation and the negotiation of values (e.g. Bulkeley et al, 2015; Nightingale, 2019).
Accordingly, a challenge for commoning mobility and urban transformations more broadly is
negotiating collaboration and across differences.
Scholarship on urban commoning recognizes the power implicit in even the most
well-intentioned efforts to transform urban subjectivities and relations (Enright, 2019;
Nightingale, 2019). Following from this framework, I argued that the politics of social inclusion
must contend with the consequences of the exclusions that commoning creates both materially
and semiotically. A sincere engagement with the relationship between social inclusion and
mobility transitions is incompatible with the “pursuit of an 'apolitical' economic equilibrium,
turning politics into something that we should all agree on—if we are rational” backed up by
transport planning documents written in a way that obscures conflict (Sager, 1999: 517).
From this perspective, I agree with the conclusion in Wanvik and Haarstad (2021) that the
conception of a new party insisting on the re-politicization of questions around social inclusion
and mobility can potentially be a positive force contributing to democratic transitions. In
addition, the re-politicization has activated other groups to organize and counter demonstrate,
producing political spaces of civic engagement outside of voting for representatives and
regimented participatory planning activities. However, in the following discussion, I extend
Wanvik and Haarstad’s analysis and discuss in more detail the challenges posed by populist
ruptures in the context of commoning urban mobility. The discussion unfolds in two parts: (i)
legitimacy and trade-offs in procedural justice, (ii) producing an ‘us’ and a ‘them’: inclusion
beyond ‘those who have the least.’
6.3.1. Legitimacy and procedural justice trade-offs
Mobility justice scholars argue that for transformations to be progressive, inclusion needs to
happen from the earliest stages of planning processes and forward (Sheller and Urry, 2006;
Sheller, 2018). However, the challenges and limitations faced by participatory approaches should
not be understated. All three interventions I analyzed have involved low levels of public
participation in the early stages of planning processes with the exception of the pilot car free
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zone in the city center. In the following subsection I discuss the challenges for more inclusive
processes related to materializing a common urban mobility system.
A substantial limitation for participation and political negotiation related to the tolls is the
interlocking nature of the multilateral urban growth agreement. The agreement, which governs
the tolls and the light rail, means that there is little scope for local politics to change the agenda.
This situation is perhaps positive for both decarbonization and for social inclusion as I have
argued in the previous sections. However, Wanvik and Haarstad (2021) and Wågsæther et al
(forthcoming) have argued that the populist rupture in Bergen may be a response to the
depoliticization of the mobility transition. These authors, (myself one of them) observed that
perceptions of the mobility transition as driven by technical experts or “elite” politicians is what
seems to motivate the populist resistance, with the argument that the shift is far removed from
“ordinary people'' and their concerns. This view is exemplified in the speculation from the
representative from the city council’s department for climate, environment and city development
(interviewed 04.11.2020) that the lack of public participation in the placement of the toll stations
may have led to decreased public acceptance, citing the lower levels of resistance in Trondheim
where the process had been substantially more participatory.
However, there are other potential explanations for less resistance in Trondheim. For example,
Trondheim chose to develop a rapid bus transit system instead of a light rail. There are
geographic and political reasons this solution was chosen in Trondheim but crucially, it is also
substantially cheaper than a light rail, thus requiring less funds from tolls (Ingeborgrud, 2020).
After spending the last year talking to people and reflecting about this issue, I am not convinced
that a failure of procedural justice or depoliticization entirely captures the problem. Deeper
participatory processes at the local level, circumscribed by the need to rapidly decarbonize, may
fail to assuage the resistance. Moreover, when participation is reduced to enrollment as in the
suburban car free zones, Hanssen and co-authors (2015) argue that people begin to feel like
objects rather than subjects with any power to impact the direction of a plan. The authors
conclude that when people do not feel heard, their confidence in planners and elected
representatives is diminished. According to Mouffe (2005), these are the conditions which
support populist ruptures. Therefore, I argue that participatory processes are important and
valuable but also risky if planners are unable or unwilling to delegate any real power.
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Another theory of legitimation that Bergen’s populist rupture troubles is the link between public
acceptance and using funds from tolls to finance public transportation. Counter to findings in
other cities presented in section 5.2.1, (Viegas, 2001; Levinson, 2010), the resistance to tolls in
Bergen and corresponding mistrust of municipal planners is galvanized rather than reduced by
using a portion of the funds to finance public transportation expansion. Their supposition was
that lack of trust in government officials and concerns about corruption could be alleviated
through dedicating funds from tolls towards public transportation infrastructure and operations.
However, in Bergen I find the contrary. Investment in public transportation infrastructure is used
as a source of suspicion and anger in a country with a historically strong social contract and high
level of transparency. On the other hand, if funds from tolls were not used to partially finance
public transportation, maybe there would be even less public acceptance and more solidarity with
the toll resistance movement. Rather than a straightforward rebuke of Viegas (2001) and
Levinson (2010), my findings indicate that resistance to tolls in Bergen, and consequently
theories about public acceptance towards road pricing more broadly, is better understood in the
situated context of populist rhetorical strategies. These strategies and their relationship to the
interventions studied in this thesis are discussed below.
6.3.2. Us and them: inclusion beyond ‘those who have the least’
Populism relies on the discursive formulation of an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, where the us implies ‘real’
or ‘regular’ people and the them are ‘elites’. As scholars have noted one of the challenges for
scholarship on populism is that it’s very difficult to define what they mean by ‘elites’ (Sager,
2020). It seems to be a flexible category open to whoever becomes the enemy of the ‘real’ people
(Temelkuran, 2019). In the Bergen case, regular people are car drivers who must face urban
elites such as politicians of all parties besides their own, professional planners, property
developers, academics, climate activists, cyclists and seemingly everyone who lives inside the
toll ring. One of the party’s taglines is ‘A city for all of us’ signaling commitment to social
inclusion, however the implication is that currently the city is only for ‘elites’ who live in the
center.
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The toll ring engenders a spatial division which supports this rhetorical construction. The next
step for populist group building is questioning the legitimacy of planners and policy makers
(Sager, 2020). Many people who drive and pay tolls do not identify with the anti-toll party. The
unifying factor seems to be distrust of the government which is a central aspect of all populist
ruptures. The claims formalized in their party platform such as: lack of transparency in city
planning, the use of funds generated from tolls and accusations of economic collusion between
spatial planners and private developers reflect a suspicion towards professional planners in
particular. As I noted in my review of the commoning literature, there has not yet been attention
paid to the potential for commoning projects to generate regressive, populist political
movements. I contribute to this field of scholarship some reflections on the relationship between
liberal policies of redress, dynamic social inclusion and urban commoning.
This is a crucial issue as these types of conflicts are likely to occur more and more frequently as
transformations proceed. The tension only grows as some cities pursue progressive policies in
the context of growing inequality and neoliberalisation at national and global scales. Thinking
with Cass and co-authors (2005) about the relationship between social exclusion and escalating
levels of mobility in societies, or hypermobility (Urry, 2000), I wish to highlight a limitation to
liberal policies of redress. The impact of progressive policies to improve conditions for the most
disadvantaged residents following the principles laid out by Rawls (1971) must be understood in
the context of limited abilities at the municipal scale to deprivilege investments in mobility
infrastructure for kinetic elites (Cresswell, 2010), i.e. people with the flexibility and resources to
capitalize on reduced travel times between cities. This leaves the middle class feeling left out.
The phenomenon raised by the House Bank representative called ‘the missing middle’, whereby
middle class families are pushed out of the housing market but are ineligible for help from the
House Bank, demonstrates this issue. The anticipated toll hikes from the mega road projects are
another. My hypothesis is that there is a partial, causal relationship between middle class populist
ruptures and progressive policies for social inclusion that only target ‘the least well off’ while
everyone else is left to navigate market driven environments.
Between these two prominent statements in the anti-toll party platform; The party “opposes
policies that disproportionately impact those who have the least” and “opposes climate politics
which are intrusive to people's lives” the latter emerges as the salient sentiment in practice and
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policy rather than the former. For example, those who ‘have the least’ are relegated to those who
have the least among those who can own and drive cars. According to the travel habits survey, 40
percent of households in the lowest income bracket do not have access to a car (Urbanet, 2020b).
While the narrative of social exclusion resulting from the tolls is countered by empirical
research, the situation reflects the gap between measurable equity impacts and perceptions of
fairness. This is a sticky problem for progressive policy makers who require legitimacy from
broad support.
There is also a risk of trivializing local struggles in the effort to put climate change and the city
center in the foreground. The opportunities available to people, including the choice of travel
modes, are circumscribed by the built environment in which they live. This in turn depends on a
number of relational factors that inform decisions about where to live. People have varying
capabilities to influence these conditions, constrained not only by economic capacity but also
other concerns highlighted in the mobilities scholarship such as emotional ties to a place, family
obligations such as elderly care and partner job locations which complicate ethical frameworks
based on the methodological individualism implicit in rational choice theory.
Nevertheless, commoning necessitates boundaries and exclusions. The anti-toll party’s policy
statement, “we oppose climate policies that are intrusive in people’s lives'' points to a crucial
question for social inclusion and low carbon transitions: what if a significant portion of the
population does not wish to be included in the transformation because they wish for nothing to
change? In that case, the solutions they are willing to entertain do not revolve around making the
transformation more inclusive but rather demanding they be included without changing. An
important observation here is that the anti-toll party often points to a lack of adequate public
transportation as a reason they need to drive but never, in any of its communications, demands
expanded bus services. This aspect of the debate undermines the anti-toll rhetorical appeals to
support those who have the least. However, as illustrated in my comparison of liberal distributive
justice and commoning as well as the previous discussion sections, a focus on who can be
represented as having the least may be counter productive. Rather, the issue for dynamic social
inclusion is how to use an understanding of mobility as movement, meaning and practice to
enable as many people as possible to participate in commoning urban mobility.
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6.3.3. Concluding reflections on the politics of social inclusion
Large scale interventions in mobility systems have implications for the urban politics of
sustainability transitions. I identify trust in governance as a key condition in support of
commoning and social inclusion during transitions. There is potential for deeper participatory
processes to increase trust. However, my findings are inconclusive on this potential and indicate
that attempts at more participatory planning and local democracy may be insufficient to address
the underlying frustrations evident in populist resistance. There is certainly no consensus on what
these underlying causes are, but I venture two points. First, in the context of national and global
processes dominated by neoliberal ideology, growing inequality and the retreat of the welfare
state to entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989), redress at the local scale will be limited and we can
expect frustrations over inequality and associated social exclusions to grow. Second, if people
cannot imagine themselves benefiting from low carbon transformations, it makes sense they will
resist imposed changes to their ways of moving, their social practices and their cultural
representations. Thus, building solidarity around the shared responsibility for the impact of
mobility interventions on society as a whole and on differently situated people, while leaving




The aim of this thesis was to reflect on the systemic parameters of social inclusion in the context
of Bergen’s low carbon mobility transition and to describe the challenges of applying these
insights in practice. The city of Bergen is committed to reducing the use of private vehicles and
prioritizing walking, cycling and public transportation as a local effort to mitigate climate change
and promote people centric urban development. The case study involved three sub-units of
analysis: light rail expansion, congestion tolls and car free zones. These interventions were
chosen because they directly challenge the historically prioritized, collective provision of
infrastructure for automobility. For this reason, they have been hotly contested in the public
discourse which is the second justification for studying these three interventions. In the last city
elections, a populist party called ‘the people’s action against toll roads’ made unprecedented
gains for a new party (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2021). The protest party contests the three
interventions studied in this thesis on the grounds that they cause social exclusion and
disproportionately impact those who have the least.
This thesis foregrounds the challenges of reconciling multiple aspects of social inclusion within
urban transformation by applying a ‘commoning’ approach. Broadly, commoning refers to
processes and conditions which support sharing resources and resist privatization and enclosure
(Helfrich and Bollier, 2015; Singh, 2017). Commoning mobility means recognizing the shared
responsibility for how different mobility constellations shape societies (Nikolaeva et al, 2019).
This approach critically engages with the strong normative tradition of liberal distributive justice
which prioritizes the value of individual choice and focuses on safety net solutions for
disadvantaged people. I have argued that approaching the question of social inclusion through
straightforward redistribution reinforces the defining characteristics, boundaries and values of
the present system. To operationalize social inclusion grounded in the commoning framework, I
introduced the term dynamic social inclusion which moves beyond inclusion into the status quo
towards inclusion into an emergent system that is still becoming.
This approach to inclusion is still concerned with improving conditions for the least well off but
also focuses on changing cultures of mobility to support collective resource use. It expands from
a narrow view of redistribution within the current system and treats urban mobility systems in
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terms of social production, necessitating greater inclusion in planning processes. Thus, dynamic
social inclusion accounts for time and place specific claims in the context of shifting norms,
practices and provision towards a common urban mobility system. In Bergen this is a key
element in the politics of mobility and social justice discourses. The primary concern for social
inclusion in the public discourse is not the enrollment of previously marginalized residents into
the current system but the potential for people whose movements, meanings and practices have
hitherto been enabled collectively to find themselves subject to potential social exclusion and
more burdens than benefits related to the new common system.
To answer the research question, ‘how are key policy interventions in Bergen aimed at restricting
car use impacting social inclusion in the city?’, I employed multiple qualitative methods
including 20 semi-structured interviews with 25 actors involved in formal processes at the
municipal scale, a co-production workshop with mobility planners and 3 focus groups with
residents. I have answered the research question in two ways. First, I will summarize the findings
for each intervention, then I will summarize how my analysis informs and is informed by key
conceptual areas related to mobility.
Beginning with the light rail, the design of the infrastructure itself promotes social inclusion
through universal design and urban development. However, as the basis for the city’s
densification plan in the context of market driven property development, the light rail becomes a
driver of urban rent and gentrification. There is a risk that only people with the most resources
and people who are willing to live in small, low quality apartments will be able to live near the
light rail. Municipal planners and policy makers are cognizant of this challenge but face barriers
in other sectors and at other scales, a recurring theme throughout the thesis.
Congestion tolls have yet to impact social inclusion in terms of measurable levels of participation
in society. However, the formation of a new, popular political party solely formed to resist tolls
demonstrates that tolls have impacted perceptions of social inclusion and fairness. People who
voted for the new, protest party do not feel their interests and voices are being represented in the
governance and planning of urban mobility which has become closed off to negotiation through
multilateral agreements. Furthermore, the potential for social exclusion related to tolls will be
exacerbated by large mega road projects that reinforce regimes of automobility and primarily
benefit people in higher income brackets. These projects will not contribute to expanding public
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transportation or benefit local car dependent commuters but they will increase the amount local
drivers pay in tolls. Therefore, as with the light rail, understanding the relationship between tolls
and social inclusion is entangled with processes in other scales and institutions.
Finally, car free zones impact social inclusion primarily by creating built environments that
support soft mobility and spaces of encounter. Considering 40 percent of people in the lowest
income bracket do not have access to cars, creating urban spaces that not only support soft
mobility but aim to demonstrate the future good life, promotes social inclusion. I interpret the
production of inclusive, urban spaces that support low carbon logics as instances of countering
regimes of scarcity (Hoeschelle, 2010) and enclosure from cars (Nikolaeva et al, 2019) and
affirming abundance within planetary boundaries.
Through focusing on the networked impacts of the three interventions, I have illustrated that
transport is not a discrete policy arena and examining social inclusion from an issue specific
perspective is to obscure the wider impacts of policies. By tracing the intersections of policies
and imaginaries, my analysis shows that social inclusion within mobility transitions is linked
with processes at other sectors and scales. In Bergen these include regulatory changes to the plan
and building act that leave detailed planning to private developers, liberalized housing markets
with few tools in the municipal governments hands to ensure affordable housing, programs to
restructure and defund state welfare institutions such as the state House Bank, and continued
investment in mega road projects. Overall, the policy approach to the mobility transition in
Bergen seeks to change existing conditions that reinforce reliance on cars. Therefore, taken
together, the interventions promote dynamic social inclusion by changing the social expectations
of automobility and providing alternatives.
I used the three core axes of my conceptual framework to revisit aspects of the cases in terms of
their implications for theories of social inclusion and the practice of commoning urban mobility.
Access to mobility options is important for participating in society but my findings suggest that
the pre-defined categories of vulnerability commonly employed in transport related social
exclusion approaches must be compliments rather than substitutes for participatory processes. I
further expanded the notion of access by applying Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) framework to
consider how people can access benefits from the light rail without using it to move around
through for example improved air quality and freeing up urban space. Next, I compared the way
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space, time and social change are imagined within traditional transport with the commoning
mobility framework, revealing how different imaginaries impact social inclusion. Infrastructures
and policies that reinforce the regime of automobility present barriers to commoning urban
mobility and vice versa - tradeoffs must be made (Mattoili et al, 2020).
The normative claim within the commoning mobility approach is that tradeoffs should prioritize
affirming abundance through creating the conditions for sharing resources rather than privileging
the value of individual choice and investing in reduced travel times for drivers who are able to
pay for the associated rising costs. The latter manifests in mega road projects which are
supported by an imaginary of hypermobility, technological innovation and economic growth
linked with societal benefits. I contrasted this approach with car free zones which promote
dynamic social inclusion through making space for low carbon logics, performing a good life
consonant with the strategies of low-income people without cars, and leveling the playing field
of modal choices which have historically been slanted towards systems of provision for
automobility. Finally, I elaborated on the politics of social inclusion to account for the ways in
which social inclusion rhetoric is a driving force in political advocacy for and resistance to
sustainable mobility policies. My analysis indicates that building solidarity around the shared
responsibility for the impact of mobility interventions on society as a whole and on differently
situated people, while leaving space for conflict and contradiction, is essential for the
commoning project to be socially inclusive.
I have argued that moving beyond inclusion into the current system towards inclusion into a
transformed one, requires making the process of transformation itself as inclusive as possible. If
democratic procedures and planning activities are considered unfair or closed off by technocratic
decision making, the legitimacy of commoning efforts is challenged. Hence, I confirm that
commoning mobility requires collective decisions about which social practices should be
accommodated and ongoing negotiations on what is required to participate fully in society
(Nikolaeva et al, 2019). In Bergen, lack of deeper participatory processes has been suggested as
an explanation for the populist resistance. However, my thesis indicates that depoliticization and
a lack of participatory processes is insufficient to account for populist ruptures. My argument is
that it’s not just about not being heard, it’s also about growing inequality. I identified trust in
governance as an important condition that supports commoning projects and a lack of trust as a
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defining feature of the populist movement against tolls. Despite progressive agendas in the
municipal government, they lack the authority and regulatory tools that could improve equity in
housing and mobility policies. The inability or unwillingness (depending who you ask) to
address growing inequality reinforces populist rhetorical strategies rooted in a dichotomy
between ‘urban elites’ and ‘regular people’.
Commoning literature often focuses on projects within cities, conducted ‘outside of failing states
and markets’ (Helfrich and Bollier, 2015). My contribution to commoning scholarship is an
interpretation of efforts to protect the urban commons through commoning the mobility system
using state power. Nightingale (2019) noted that processes of commoning are always at risk of
‘un-commoning’ but so far as I know my analysis is the first to consider a large scale mobility
transition as a commoning project and address the risk of un-commoning not from the state or
market actors but from middle class, populist resistance. The relationship between public
planning for socially inclusive, sustainability transitions and populist resistance is not well
understood but I identify this area as a primary area of concern for transition studies more
broadly.
Identifying these potentials and limitations of urban efforts to materialize common mobility
systems may contribute to building broader coalitions of solidarity among diverse interest
groups, thereby supporting a more robust and democratic transition to sustainable cities.
Sustainability in this framework encompasses more than decarbonization and points to a process
rather than product. Socially inclusive mobility transitions must therefore comprise sustainable
but nevertheless political modes of city-making. Finally, I have argued that sustainability
transformations require a dynamic concept of social inclusion to consider not just actors who
currently exist but actors, subject positions, relations and contingent preferences that don’t exist
yet. This is a central challenge for pursuing inter and intra generational equity. What is at stake
are inclusive low carbon societies living and dying together on a damaged planet.
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Implications for future research
The prospect of car free cities is becoming more popular in urban policy circles but academic
scholarship has barely begun to explore the issue (Khreis et al., 2017). Rather, the literature
focuses on establishing small car free zones within cities. The conditions for ensuring a transition
to a car free city is successful, including public acceptance and basic minimum standards for
accessibility through alternative modes, are not well understood (Holden et al, 2020). In Bergen,
the next major change, announced in January, 2021, will not ban all cars from the city center but
create zero emissions zones where fossil fuel cars are not allowed as part of the effort to reach
decarbonization of the city by 2030. Data presented in this thesis shows that access to an electric
car is tightly linked to higher income groups. While my analysis of the transition so far argued
that the policies studied promote dynamic social inclusion, if a ban on fossil fuel cars is
implemented without feasible alternatives in place it will likely result in social exclusion for car
dependent people in the lowest income brackets. Key areas of concern include limitations and
financial burdens associated with existing park and rides and the provision of infrastructure and
services for micro-mobility solutions such as electric scooters and bikes to help people in the
suburbs access public transportation connections. Mapping the risks for social exclusion and
initiating processes for public participation early in the strategy formation phase are crucial
factors which require investment and innovative approaches.
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Appendix
Appendix A. List of Interviewees by date interviewed
Nr. Institutional affiliation Date interviewed Remarks
1 City council member (MDG) 15.10.2020
2 City council member (Rødt) 06.11.2020
3 City council member (FNB) 27.10.2020
4 Political advisor 04.11.2020 Transport policy
5 Political advisor 24.09.2020 Urban development
6 Urban Environment Agency 28.10.2020 Mobility
7 Urban Environment Agency 08.10.2020 Mobility
8 Urban Environment Agency 09.10.2020 public procurement
9 Public Roads Administration 25.02.2020 car free downtown Bergen
10 Plan and Building dep 22.10.2020 3 planners present
11 State House Bank 10.11.2020
12 Regional committee, public transport 30.10.2020
13 Austevoll - Plan og Bygg dep. 22.10.2020 4 planners present, they commute from
Bergen to Austevoll
14 Osterøy - Plan og Bygg dep. 29.10.2020
15 Skyss 15.03.2021
16 MUST lab 21.04.2021 Innovation lab - public/private
17 Bergens næringsråd 16.10.2020
18 Bergen chamber of commerce 23.10.2020
19 Bergen og Omegn Boligbyggelag 27.10.2020 Architect and economist
20 Bryggens Venner 19.10.2020
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